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Should Judge Angela T. Quigless Be Retained?

Voters in the Eastern District will see this question on the November 3, 2026 ballot. We reviewed 22 of her rulings from 2015 to 2026, including three dissents. Here is what we found, what the court could have ruled instead, and where Act for Missouri comes down. We keep those three things separate so you can use the first two even if you disagree with the third.

Court
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District
Ballot question
“Shall Judge Angela T. Quigless be retained?” A majority of yes votes keeps her. This question appears on ballots in the Eastern District.
Appointed
April 2012, by Gov. Jay Nixon (D), to the seat vacated when Judge George Draper moved to the Missouri Supreme Court. The Judicial Performance Review Committee recommended retention in 2014, her first retention election. This is her second.
Term if retained
12 years.
Official committee recommendation
The Missouri Judicial Performance Review Committee recommends retention. It made the same recommendation for all 50 judges it reviewed this year.

How this page works

The Record

Facts only. What the judge ruled, how colleagues voted, and links to the opinions. We say plainly when something is contested or when we have not reviewed it.

What the court could have ruled

The ruling as issued and a real alternative, each with its strongest support from the opinions. Every alternative points to a lower court’s ruling, a party’s argument, a dissent, or an earlier court decision.

Act for Missouri's View

Our opinion. We say which result we think better follows the law, and where the judge’s choice shows a view different from ours. It is the only part of this page that is editorial.

Jump to: The Record • What the court could have ruled • Act for Missouri's View • Sources

The Record

Facts only

Background

Judge Quigless is a University of Missouri-Columbia graduate with a law degree from Saint Louis University. She was an associate circuit judge in St. Louis from 1995 to 2003 and a circuit judge in the 22nd Judicial Circuit from 2003 to 2012. Before the bench she worked in the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District, the St. Louis City Counselor’s Office, the St. Louis Circuit Attorney’s Office, the Missouri Public Service Commission, and the Missouri Department of Revenue. Her colleagues elected her the court’s chief judge for a one-year term beginning July 1, 2014, and she has since served as presiding judge of her division.

What we reviewed

We read 22 rulings in full or in the parts that decide them: 19 opinions she wrote and three dissents. They run from January 2015 to April 2026 and cover criminal and civil law, government power, family law, employment, and property. Ten are recent (2023 to 2026) and twelve come from earlier in her term (2015 to 2022). We chose them for what they showed about her approach, including every dissent we found. Four were chosen by a fixed rule so our picking could not steer the result: C.M.G. and Lane are her earliest and latest 2025 opinions that were not dismissals, and In re S.J.M. and Kader are her earliest non-dismissal opinions of 2015 and 2018. We also read through the court’s opinion lists for 2015 through 2023 for high-profile cases and included the ones she wrote or dissented in. We have no ruling from 2014 or 2020. She is a judge of long service, and 22 rulings are a sample, not the whole record. The Record also notes one high-profile case she joined but did not write.

Reads statutes and constitutions by their wordsVerified

In the expungement rulings the same plain-words method cut opposite ways: in N.M.C. it barred a second felony expungement, and in R.H. it allowed a burglary conviction to be expunged because the statute does not list it as ineligible. In Yocco she wrote that the court would not “add language to an unambiguous statute.” In Lane she gave the word “frame” its ordinary meaning.

Holds government to the law, and applies it for government when it requiresVerified

She ruled against the child-support agency in Cooling, vacated a court-appointed guardianship in Isreal, and held that the Mining Commission could not let a company fix its application after the fact in Nexgen. She also sided with the State in Bromwell and Yocco, and with the City in Lane and Keys.

Protects the individual when the law requires itVerified

She vacated a protection order that the evidence did not support (J.R.C.), reversed a conviction where the court never confirmed the defendant knowingly gave up his lawyer (Sullivan), and required a full record before a man could be declared incapacitated (Isreal). In her Doe 122 dissent she would have let a survivor of abuse take a claim to a jury.

Defers to trial courts and enforces appeal rulesVerified

She dismissed appeals that were not final (Planned Parenthood), sent a tax case to the Supreme Court because the Constitution gives it that jurisdiction (Armstrong-Trotwood), and found no ripe controversy (Keys). In her dissents in McEntire and J.R. she would have deferred to the trial court.

Judgment callsJudgment calls

In several rulings the law allowed more than one result. Examples: reversing a suppression order on the apparent-authority doctrine (Bromwell), upholding a charter commission (Lane), treating a disability accommodation request as protected activity while adding a jury-instruction requirement (Li Lin), reversing a $2.5 million verdict on instruction error (Kader), and her three dissents. We note where we might have gone the other way.

Applies the same approach each timeVerified

Across 22 rulings in eleven different years, she used the same method: the text, binding precedent, and the standard of review. Her results do not line up with one kind of party. This rests on a sample, not on every opinion she wrote.

Ethics, temperament, independence, clarity of writingNot yet reviewed

We have not independently reviewed these. The 2014 committee evaluation found her opinions consistent with the constitution, statutes, and precedent. The 2026 committee evaluation is linked in the sources.

Recent rulings (2023 to 2026)

Ruling 1: A challenge to a city proposition (Keys v. City of St. Louis, April 14, 2026)

The case. Laura Keys, an alderperson, challenged Proposition R, a citizen-initiated amendment to the St. Louis City Charter that voters approved. Among other things it bars aldermen from conflicts of interest, certain outside employment, and paid lobbying. She said she feared her normal legislative work could violate it. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the City, finding no justiciable controversy.

The panel and the vote. Judge Hardin-Tammons (presiding), Judge Quigless, and Judge Clark. Judge Quigless wrote the opinion, and both concurred.

What the panel held.

  • No ripe controversy existed, so the court could not decide whether Prop R is valid.
  • A court that finds no justiciable controversy must dismiss, not enter summary judgment, because summary judgment is a decision on the merits.
  • Keys did not appeal the finding that she had no controversy as a private citizen.

The panel changed the judgment to a dismissal without prejudice and affirmed it as changed.

Ruling 2: A disability and retaliation lawsuit against a university (Torre-Stewart v. Washington University, February 24, 2026)

The case. Kathryn Torre-Stewart worked for Washington University for years. After lung cancer surgery in 2016 she had trouble breathing, and after COVID in 2022 she wore a portable oxygen backpack at work. She was fired in July 2023 and sued under the Missouri Human Rights Act for disability discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation. The circuit court dismissed all three claims.

The panel and the vote. Judge Hardin-Tammons (presiding), Judge Quigless, and Judge Clark. Judge Quigless wrote the opinion, and both concurred.

What the panel held.

  • The petition did not plead facts showing a disability under the Act, meaning an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. The discrimination claim was properly dismissed.
  • It did not plead a hostile work environment based on disability.
  • It did plead the elements of retaliation, based on her complaints of discrimination. A retaliation claim can survive even when the discrimination claim fails.

The panel affirmed the dismissal of two claims, vacated it as to retaliation, and sent the case back.

Ruling 3: A charter amendment creating a commission (Lane v. City of St. Louis, November 25, 2025)

The case. In 2023 St. Louis voters approved Prop C, which created a Charter Commission and a process for proposing changes to the City Charter. Charles Lane, a resident and taxpayer, sued, saying it conflicts with Article VI, Section 32(a) of the Missouri Constitution, which says proposed charter amendments are submitted to voters “by the lawmaking body of the city.” The circuit court ruled for the City on the pleadings. We chose this ruling by a fixed rule (her latest 2025 opinion that was not a dismissal).

The panel and the vote. Judge Hardin-Tammons (presiding), Judge Quigless, and Judge Clark. Judge Quigless wrote the opinion, and both concurred.

What the panel held.

  • The parties agreed the Board of Aldermen is the lawmaking body. The question was whether the Board itself must “frame” the proposals.
  • In its ordinary meaning, “frame” means to draw up or devise, and nothing in Section 32(a) requires the Board to do that personally.
  • Lane did not plead or show a violation of Section 32(a).

The panel affirmed.

Ruling 4: A man who asked to undo his paternity (C.M.G. v. B.M.C., February 25, 2025)

The case. Mother told C.M.G. she was pregnant by another man before they began dating. He knew that when they signed an affidavit acknowledging his paternity. Years later the state child-support agency served him with a support order, which he did not contest. In 2023 he asked the court to declare he was not the father, saying he had been mistaken. The circuit court dismissed his petition. We chose this ruling by a fixed rule (her earliest 2025 opinion that was not a dismissal).

The panel and the vote. Judge Dowd (presiding), Judge Quigless, and Judge Stevens. Judge Quigless wrote the opinion, and both concurred.

What the panel held.

  • Section 210.854 lets a legal father set aside a paternity judgment based on evidence not considered earlier, such as a material mistake of fact.
  • His own petition said he knew another man was the biological father when he signed, so it showed no mistake of fact.
  • The panel did not add requirements to the statute, as he argued. His petition failed on its own facts.

The panel affirmed the dismissal.

Ruling 5: A search of a home with the father’s consent (State v. Bromwell, April 1, 2025)

The case. Police went to arrest Jesse Bromwell for a burglary they saw on surveillance video. His father owned the house and let them in. After Bromwell was detained, an officer got his father’s consent to search the residence and found evidence in a back bedroom. The circuit court suppressed it, finding no evidence the father had common authority over that room and that the father’s statement was hearsay. The State appealed.

The panel and the vote. Judge Dowd (presiding), Judge Quigless, and Judge Stevens. Judge Quigless wrote the opinion, and both concurred.

What the panel held.

  • A warrantless search is valid with the consent of someone with actual or apparent authority. Apparent authority is judged by whether officers could reasonably believe the person could consent.
  • The father owned the home, answered the door, and let the officers in, and the officers knew the defendant stayed with him. On facts the trial court found credible, an objectively reasonable officer could believe the father could consent, so the court’s finding of “zero evidence” of authority was clearly erroneous.
  • The officer’s testimony about the father’s consent explained what the officers did next and was not offered for its truth, so it was not hearsay. Bromwell had conceded this point, then tried to withdraw the concession. The panel said it would reach the same answer either way.

The panel reversed the suppression order and sent the case back.

Ruling 6: Sixteen sex-offense convictions and sentencing (State v. Yocco, July 30, 2024)

The case. A jury convicted Dominic Yocco of 16 counts of rape and sodomy involving eight victims and found him a predatory sexual offender. The circuit court sentenced him to 16 consecutive life terms, with parole eligibility after 83 years. He raised about 40 points on appeal.

The panel and the vote. Judge Page (presiding), Judge Quigless, and Judge Gaertner. Judge Quigless wrote the opinion, and both concurred.

What the panel held.

  • Life sentences for the ten second-degree rape and sodomy counts exceeded the maximum, because the predatory-offender statute does not cover those crimes. The State agreed. The panel set those ten sentences aside for resentencing.
  • The panel read “more than one victim” in the predatory-offender statute to include victims abused at different times. Yocco’s reading would add an unwritten requirement that the offenses happen together.
  • Consecutive terms were mandatory for first-degree rape and sodomy and discretionary for the rest, and the record showed the trial court used its discretion.
  • It denied the remaining points, including an unpreserved jury-instruction claim.

The panel affirmed all 16 convictions and the life sentences on the six first-degree counts, and sent the ten counts back for resentencing.

Ruling 7: A protection order for a former girlfriend (J.R.C. v. S.L.F., March 12, 2024)

The case. After about six months together, J.R.C. asked for an order of protection against her former boyfriend, saying he stalked and harassed her. The circuit court granted a full order after a hearing.

The panel and the vote. Judge Page (presiding), Judge Quigless, and Judge Gaertner. Judge Quigless wrote the opinion, and both concurred.

What the panel held.

  • The law requires evidence that the conduct caused a fear of physical harm, and that a reasonable person would share it.
  • J.R.C. testified she was “startled” when he pushed her after she lunged at him, and that she was “alarmed” by belongings left on her porch that both sides had agreed to exchange. The messages were not in the record.
  • The Adult Abuse Act “was not designed to resolve minor arguments between adults.” The panel found the evidence insufficient on both fear tests.

The panel reversed and vacated the order.

Ruling 8: A mining permit (Nexgen Silica v. Missouri Department of Natural Resources, October 17, 2023)

The case. Nexgen Silica applied to mine sandstone near Ste. Genevieve. The state issued a permit, and the Mining Commission later denied it because Nexgen did not list everyone with an interest in the land. Nexgen appealed. Operation Sand, a group of nearby residents, also appealed, saying the Commission should have rejected the application on more grounds.

The panel and the vote. Judge Page (presiding), Judge Quigless, and Judge Gaertner. Judge Quigless wrote the opinion, and both concurred.

What the panel held.

  • The statute requires the application to name all persons with an interest in the land and to carry their written consent. Nexgen’s did not.
  • The Commission has no authority to let an applicant amend an incomplete application during an appeal after a permit has issued.
  • Operation Sand got what it asked for, denial of the permit, so it was not aggrieved and its cross-appeal was dismissed.
  • The panel denied Operation Sand’s request for attorney’s fees because the state’s position was substantially justified.

The panel affirmed the denial of the permit.

Ruling 9: A guardianship without a full record (In the Matter of Timothy Lee Isreal, August 15, 2023)

The case. Timothy Isreal, 48, had heart failure, diabetes, and kidney problems and visited the emergency room often. A hospital would not discharge him without someone responsible for his care, and its physician petitioned for a guardian. The circuit court declared him totally incapacitated and disabled and appointed the county public administrator as guardian and conservator.

The panel and the vote. Judge Page (presiding), Judge Quigless, and Judge Gaertner. Judge Quigless wrote the opinion, and both concurred.

What the panel held.

  • Guardianship takes away a person’s liberty, so the petitioner must prove incapacity by clear and convincing evidence.
  • The circuit court relied on testimony from an earlier hearing, and no record or transcript of that hearing exists. The panel could not tell what evidence the court had.
  • Isreal’s challenge “appears meritorious on its face,” but a court of appeals may not guess at the evidence.

The panel reversed and sent the case back for a proper record.

Ruling 10: Expunging two felony records (N.M.C. v. Missouri State Highway Patrol Criminal Records Repository, February 21, 2023)

The case. N.M.C. asked a St. Louis County court to expunge records of two felony drug cases, one from 2006 that ended in a dismissal after drug court and one from 2013, plus two ordinance violations. The court granted all of it over the Highway Patrol’s objection.

The panel and the vote. Judge Quigless (presiding), Judge Sullivan, and Judge Clayton. Judge Quigless wrote the opinion, and both concurred.

What the panel held.

  • Section 610.140.12 allows a person only one felony expungement in a lifetime.
  • A dismissed felony charge is still an “offense.” The statute covers charges as well as convictions, and N.M.C.’s reading would make parts of it meaningless.
  • The trial court erred in expunging both felonies.

The panel reversed and sent the case back so N.M.C. can choose which felony to expunge.

Earlier in her term (2015 to 2022)

Ruling 11: An arrest for resisting a detention (State v. Sullivan, February 15, 2022)

The case. Eugene Sullivan was charged with resisting a lawful detention. The Public Defender denied him help, he signed a waiver of counsel, and he represented himself at trial. The record shows a docket note about the “perils of self-representation” but no transcript of that conference.

The panel and the vote. Judge Hess (presiding), Judge Quigless, and Judge Dolan. Judge Quigless wrote the opinion, and both concurred.

What the panel held.

  • The court allowed him to represent himself without making an adequate record that his waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent.

The panel reversed the conviction and sent the case back.

Ruling 12: Medicaid payments to Planned Parenthood (Planned Parenthood of St. Louis Region v. Department of Social Services, December 14, 2021)

The case. The State refused to pay Planned Parenthood for 2020 Medicaid claims, citing a provision in the appropriations bill that barred funds to abortion facilities and their affiliates. In 2020 the Missouri Supreme Court had struck down the same kind of provision in the prior year’s bill, holding that a budget bill cannot change general law. The State agreed that decision controlled. The circuit court ordered payment and sent the case back to the Administrative Hearing Commission to set the amounts, interest, and attorney’s fees. The State appealed only the fees.

The panel and the vote. Judge Hess (presiding), Judge Quigless, and Judge Dolan. Judge Quigless wrote the opinion, and both concurred.

What the panel held.

  • Appeals exist only where a statute allows them, and the judgment was not final because the amounts and fees remained to be set.
  • The panel decided nothing about abortion, Medicaid funding, or the fee award itself.

The panel dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

Ruling 13: A juvenile shooting case and a video (In the Interest of J.R., October 19, 2021)

The case. A juvenile was adjudicated delinquent after a bench trial for shooting a gun at two women and into a house. The defense wanted to introduce a video it said showed another person, a girl, firing the gun. The court excluded it.

The panel and the vote. Judge Dolan wrote the opinion. Judge Hess concurred. Judge Quigless dissented.

What the panel held, and her dissent.

  • The majority held the video was admissible and its exclusion was prejudicial error.
  • Judge Quigless agreed the video was admissible but found the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, because three witnesses had already testified that a girl fired the gun and the video did not rule out that the juvenile also fired. She would have affirmed, citing deference to the trial court on credibility.

The majority reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Ruling 14: An expungement of a 1970 burglary conviction (R.H. v. Missouri State Highway Patrol Criminal Records Repository, July 9, 2019)

The case. R.H. sought to expunge several old records, including a 1970 second-degree burglary conviction. The circuit court refused on that conviction, ruling that the statute excluded it.

The panel and the vote. Judge Richter (presiding), Judge Quigless, and Judge Clayton. Judge Quigless wrote the opinion, and both concurred.

What the panel held.

  • The statute lists ten categories of offenses that cannot be expunged, and second-degree burglary is not one of them. The respondents agreed.
  • The circuit court also erred in finding R.H. did not meet the statute’s other criteria on this record.

The panel reversed and sent the case back.

Ruling 15: A lawsuit over a school’s knowledge of a brother’s abuse (John Doe 122 v. Marianist Province and Chaminade College Preparatory, December 31, 2019)

The case. Doe 122 sued a religious order and a St. Louis-area high school, saying a Marianist brother sexually abused him in 1971 and that the school knew of the brother’s history. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendants.

The panel and the vote. Judge Hoff (presiding) wrote the opinion. Judge Sullivan concurred. Judge Quigless dissented in part.

What the panel held, and her dissent.

  • The majority would have affirmed but transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court because of its importance.
  • Judge Quigless agreed with the majority on the negligence claims. On the claim that the order intentionally failed to supervise clergy, she would have reversed. The disputed question was whether the order knew of the brother’s earlier abuse, and an expert testified that such abuse is always described in coded language in personnel files.
  • She wrote that treating that evidence as speculation means a plaintiff could never prove knowledge unless the defendant admits it.

The panel transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court.

Ruling 16: A reversed discrimination verdict against a state university (Kader v. Board of Regents of Harris-Stowe State University, January 9, 2018)

The case. Dr. Shereen Kader, an Egyptian-born professor on a temporary visa, sued Harris-Stowe for national-origin discrimination and retaliation. A jury awarded her $750,000 in actual and $1,750,000 in punitive damages. We chose this ruling by a fixed rule (her earliest 2018 opinion that was not a dismissal).

The panel and the vote. Judge Gaertner (presiding), Judge Quigless, and Judge Clayton. Judge Quigless wrote the opinion, and both concurred.

What the panel held.

  • The verdict-directing instructions listed several alternative acts the jury could find, including some that are not adverse employment actions. A jury could have returned its verdict on an act that does not count.
  • Alternatives in such an instruction must each be legally sufficient, and the error was prejudicial.
  • The panel did not reach the other three points.

The panel reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Ruling 17: An injured researcher’s retaliation verdict (Li Lin v. Ellis and Washington University, November 13, 2018)

The case. Dr. Li Lin, a Washington University employee with back pain from herniated disks, repeatedly asked for work restrictions. After she was fired, a jury found Washington University liable for retaliation under the Missouri Human Rights Act.

The panel and the vote. Judge Richter (presiding), Judge Quigless, and Judge Clayton. Judge Quigless wrote the opinion, and both concurred.

What the panel held.

  • Requesting an accommodation for a disability is protected activity that can support a retaliation claim, following federal law and the Act’s purpose. The evidence was enough to support the verdict.
  • Because the jury had to decide whether she engaged in protected activity, the verdict director should have required a separate finding that she requested an accommodation in good faith with a reasonable belief it was for a disability. It did not.

The panel reversed and sent the case back for a new trial.

Ruling 18: A conflict of interest in a public defender’s office (State v. McEntire, March 13, 2018)

The case. Randy McEntire’s public defender learned the night before trial that his supervisor had briefly represented the State’s confidential informant in an unrelated case. The defender said he had no confidential information and offered to withdraw. The circuit court did not remove him, and McEntire was convicted.

The panel and the vote. Judge Gaertner (presiding) wrote the opinion. Judge Clayton concurred. Judge Quigless dissented.

What the panel held, and her dissent.

  • The majority reversed and remanded, finding the circuit court erred.
  • Judge Quigless agreed with the majority’s principles but not their application. She found that the supervisor’s contact with the informant was limited to bond and dismissal of the other case, and that none of it was shared with the defender. She would have found no conflict and affirmed.

The majority reversed and remanded.

Ruling 19: DACA and in-district tuition (Jane Doe v. St. Louis Community College, July 11, 2017)

The case. Jane Doe, brought to the U.S. as a child and holding DACA status, lived in the college district. The college began charging her the international student rate after the legislature put a preamble in an appropriations bill (House Bill 3) saying no funds could go to public colleges that charge students with an unlawful immigration status less than the international rate. She sued, saying the college’s residency regulation entitled her to in-district tuition.

The panel and the vote. Judge Quigless wrote the opinion. Judge Dowd concurred. Judge Van Amburg dissented.

What the panel held, and the dissent.

  • The regulation requires “resident alien status, as determined by federal authority,” and DACA, by its own terms, confers no immigration status. The trial court reached the same result by reading the phrase to mean only permanent residents. The panel did not adopt that reading but affirmed on its own.
  • The regulation does not violate equal protection, because people with deferred action are not similarly situated to people with immigrant status, and it is not preempted by federal law.
  • The dissent would have ended the case on the preamble, which both sides agreed is unenforceable. It noted the college had charged DACA students the in-district rate for years before the preamble, and the legislature had twice rejected bills to change that.

The panel affirmed.

Ruling 20: A tax case sent to the Supreme Court (Armstrong-Trotwood v. State Tax Commission, December 20, 2016)

The case. Landowners with property in St. Louis County said the State Tax Commission failed to equalize assessments between counties, so they paid more tax than similar owners in Jefferson and Franklin counties. The circuit court dismissed all five counts.

The panel and the vote. Judge Quigless (presiding) wrote the opinion. Judge Dowd and Judge Van Amburg concurred.

What the panel held.

  • The issues involve the “construction of the revenue laws of the state,” which the Constitution assigns exclusively to the Missouri Supreme Court.
  • The panel decided nothing about the merits.

The panel transferred the case to the Supreme Court.

Ruling 21: Attorney’s fees against the child-support agency (Cooling v. Department of Social Services, March 15, 2016)

The case. The Family Support Division opened a child support case against Nathan Cooling based on his ex-wife’s application, without verifying it. A 2000 divorce decree had ordered him to pay support directly to his ex-wife. He prevailed in the agency actions and sought attorney’s fees under the state fee-shifting statute. The Director denied them, and the circuit court awarded $24,100.

The panel and the vote. Judge Hess (presiding), Judge Quigless, and Judge Gaertner. Judge Quigless wrote the opinion, and both concurred.

What the panel held.

  • The panel reversed the Director’s denial of fees and the circuit court’s amount.
  • It sent the case back for the amount to be set.

The panel reversed and remanded.

Ruling 22: A guardianship for a young man with Down syndrome (In the Matter of S.J.M., January 20, 2015)

The case. S.J.M., who has Down syndrome, turned 18 and his mother petitioned in St. Charles County probate court to be his guardian. His parents’ divorce decree from St. Louis County already gave them joint legal custody. The father argued the probate court should not act. The probate court appointed the mother. We chose this ruling by a fixed rule (her earliest 2015 opinion that was not a dismissal).

The panel and the vote. Judge Quigless (chief judge) wrote the opinion. Judge Norton concurred, and Judge Richter concurred in a separate opinion.

What the panel held.

  • The panel agreed with the father that the probate court’s guardianship order overlapped the divorce court’s custody judgment on the same issues and parties, which risked wasteful or inconsistent orders.

The panel reversed and sent the case back.

One more case on the record

In Estate of Fox v. Johnson & Johnson (October 17, 2017), a talc product-liability case, Judge Van Amburg wrote the opinion vacating the judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction, following a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision. Judge Quigless, as presiding judge, concurred, and Judge Odenwald concurred in a separate opinion. She did not write it, so we do not count it as one of her rulings.

What the court could have ruled

The ruling as issued and a real alternative. Not our conclusion.

For each ruling, the alternative below is one that a judge, a trial court, or a party actually argued. Neither column is our conclusion. That comes in the next section. Where a ruling was a dissent, the majority’s result is the left column and her view is the right.

Keys v. City of St. Louis (2026)

What the panel ruled

  • No ripe controversy, so no ruling on whether Prop R is valid.
  • Dismiss without prejudice instead of entering summary judgment.

Support for this ruling: the panel, with both colleagues concurring.

What it could have ruled (Keys and the City)

  • Reach the merits, as Keys asked, and decide whether Prop R is valid.
  • Or, as the City argued in the alternative, hold Prop R valid.

Support for the alternative: Keys’s argument that she faced a reasonable risk of penalties, and the City’s alternative argument.

Torre-Stewart v. Washington University (2026)

What the panel ruled

  • Dismissal affirmed for disability discrimination and hostile work environment.
  • Retaliation claim revived.

Support for this ruling: the panel, with both colleagues concurring.

What it could have ruled (the University and Torre-Stewart)

  • Affirm the dismissal of all three claims, as the University argued.
  • Or treat her breathing difficulty and oxygen use as pleading a disability, as she argued.

Support for the alternative: the circuit court’s dismissal of all three claims, and Torre-Stewart’s argument on appeal.

Lane v. City of St. Louis (2025)

What the panel ruled

  • “Frame” means to draw up, and the Board need not personally draft proposals.
  • The amendment stands.

Support for this ruling: the panel, with both colleagues concurring.

What it could have ruled (Lane)

  • Read Section 32(a) as the exclusive method, requiring the elected Board to originate proposals.
  • Strike the amendment for bypassing the Board.

Support for the alternative: Lane’s argument that the Constitution requires submission only “by the lawmaking body of the city.”

C.M.G. v. B.M.C. (2025)

What the panel ruled

  • His own petition showed he knew when he signed, so no mistake of fact.
  • Dismissal affirmed.

Support for this ruling: the panel, with both colleagues concurring.

What it could have ruled (C.M.G.)

  • Read Section 210.854 as not requiring ignorance of paternity, and let the petition proceed.

Support for the alternative: C.M.G.’s argument that the trial court added requirements the statute does not state.

State v. Bromwell (2025)

What the panel ruled

  • The facts, found credible, would lead a reasonable officer to believe the father could consent. Suppression reversed.

Support for this ruling: the panel, with both colleagues concurring.

What it could have ruled (Bromwell and the trial court)

  • Affirm suppression, as the trial court found “zero evidence” that the father had common authority over the area searched.
  • Defer to the trial judge, whose credibility findings favored the State’s witnesses but whose legal conclusion went the other way.

Support for the alternative: the trial court’s judgment and the standard that appeals courts defer to its findings.

State v. Yocco (2024)

What the panel ruled

  • Ten life sentences set aside as unlawful; the rest affirmed.
  • “More than one victim” covers offenses at different times.
  • Consecutive terms stand.

Support for this ruling: the panel, with both colleagues concurring.

What it could have ruled (Yocco)

  • Read “more than one victim” to require offenses committed together, which would void the predatory-offender finding.
  • Hold that the trial court failed to use its discretion on consecutive terms.

Support for the alternative: Yocco’s arguments on appeal, which the panel rejected.

J.R.C. v. S.L.F. (2024)

What the panel ruled

  • Evidence insufficient to show fear of physical harm, subjectively or objectively.
  • Order vacated.

Support for this ruling: the panel, with both colleagues concurring.

What it could have ruled (J.R.C. and the trial court)

  • Affirm the full order of protection on the trial court’s finding of stalking and harassment, viewing the evidence in its favor.

Support for the alternative: the trial court’s judgment after hearing live testimony.

Nexgen Silica v. DNR (2023)

What the panel ruled

  • The permit was properly denied; no amendment during appeal.
  • State’s position was substantially justified, so no fees.

Support for this ruling: the panel, with both colleagues concurring.

What it could have ruled (Nexgen and Operation Sand)

  • Allow Nexgen to cure its application, as it argued.
  • Reach Operation Sand’s additional grounds and award it fees, as it asked.

Support for the alternative: Nexgen’s and Operation Sand’s arguments on appeal.

In the Matter of Isreal (2023)

What the panel ruled

  • Reverse and remand because the record is incomplete.

Support for this ruling: the panel, with both colleagues concurring.

What it could have ruled (the parties)

  • Affirm the guardianship on the circuit court’s finding of incapacity.
  • Or reverse outright for insufficient evidence, as Isreal argued.

Support for the alternative: the circuit court’s judgment, and Isreal’s sufficiency argument, which the panel said “appears meritorious.”

N.M.C. v. Highway Patrol (2023)

What the panel ruled

  • One felony expungement per lifetime, and a dismissed charge counts.
  • Reversed; N.M.C. chooses which to expunge.

Support for this ruling: the panel, with both colleagues concurring.

What it could have ruled (N.M.C. and the trial court)

  • Affirm the expungement of both, treating the dismissed 2006 charge as not a “felony offense.”

Support for the alternative: the trial court’s judgment and N.M.C.’s interpretation, which the panel said would make parts of the statute meaningless.

State v. Sullivan (2022)

What the panel ruled

  • The record did not show a knowing waiver of counsel.
  • Conviction reversed.

Support for this ruling: the panel, with both colleagues concurring.

What it could have ruled (the State)

  • Affirm, treating the signed waiver form and the “perils of self-representation” docket entry as enough.

Support for the alternative: the signed waiver and docket entry in the record.

Planned Parenthood v. DSS (2021)

What the panel ruled

  • No final judgment, so no appeal.

Support for this ruling: the panel, with both colleagues concurring.

What it could have ruled (the State)

  • Hear the appeal of the fee award now, as the State asked.

Support for the alternative: the State’s argument that the circuit court’s fee ruling was reviewable. Planned Parenthood moved to dismiss.

In the Interest of J.R. (2021)

What the panel ruled

  • Excluding the video was prejudicial error.
  • New trial.

Support for this ruling: Judge Dolan, with Judge Hess concurring.

What it could have ruled (Judge Quigless, dissenting)

  • The video was admissible but the error was harmless, because it repeated what three witnesses had said.
  • Affirm, deferring to the trial court on credibility.

Support for the alternative: her dissent, and cases holding that excluded evidence that is cumulative is harmless.

R.H. v. Highway Patrol (2019)

What the panel ruled

  • Second-degree burglary is not on the list of ineligible offenses.
  • Reversed and remanded.

Support for this ruling: the panel, with both colleagues concurring.

What it could have ruled (the trial court)

  • Affirm the refusal to expunge the burglary conviction.

Support for the alternative: the trial court’s judgment. The respondents on appeal agreed the offense was eligible.

John Doe 122 v. Marianist Province (2019)

What the panel ruled

  • Affirm summary judgment; transfer to the Supreme Court.

Support for this ruling: Judge Hoff, with Judge Sullivan concurring.

What it could have ruled (Judge Quigless, dissenting in part)

  • Reverse on the intentional-failure-to-supervise claim and let a jury decide whether the order knew of the brother’s history.

Support for the alternative: her dissent, and the rule that knowledge is usually proved by circumstantial evidence.

Kader v. Harris-Stowe (2018)

What the panel ruled

  • The instructions allowed a verdict on acts that are not adverse employment actions.
  • New trial.

Support for this ruling: the panel, with both colleagues concurring.

What it could have ruled (Kader)

  • Affirm the $2.5 million verdict, as the trial court did when it denied a new trial.

Support for the alternative: the jury verdict and the trial court’s denial of a new trial.

Li Lin v. Ellis and Washington University (2018)

What the panel ruled

  • An accommodation request can be protected activity.
  • But the instruction needed a separate good-faith finding. New trial.

Support for this ruling: the panel, with both colleagues concurring.

What it could have ruled (the parties)

  • Affirm the verdict, as the trial court did.
  • Or reverse outright, as Washington University argued, holding that asking for an accommodation is not protected activity under the Act.

Support for the alternative: the trial court’s judgment, and Washington University’s argument on appeal.

State v. McEntire (2018)

What the panel ruled

  • Reverse and remand: the circuit court erred on the conflict of interest.

Support for this ruling: Judge Gaertner, with Judge Clayton concurring.

What it could have ruled (Judge Quigless, dissenting)

  • Find no conflict, because the supervisor’s contact with the informant was limited and nothing was shared.
  • Affirm as within the trial court’s discretion.

Support for the alternative: her dissent and a 1977 decision holding no per se conflict arises from such a connection.

Jane Doe v. St. Louis Community College (2017)

What the panel ruled

  • DACA confers no “resident alien status,” so the regulation does not give her in-district tuition.
  • No equal-protection or preemption violation.

Support for this ruling: Judge Quigless, with Judge Dowd concurring.

What it could have ruled (Doe and Judge Van Amburg, dissenting)

  • Strike the preamble as unenforceable and direct the college to resume its earlier practice of charging DACA students the in-district rate.

Support for the alternative: the dissent, which cites the college’s long practice and the legislature’s rejection of two bills to change it.

Armstrong-Trotwood v. State Tax Commission (2016)

What the panel ruled

  • Transfer to the Supreme Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction.

Support for this ruling: the panel, with both colleagues concurring.

What it could have ruled (the landowners)

  • Decide the appeal of the dismissal of all five counts.

Support for the alternative: the landowners’ appeal. The panel held the Constitution gave it no authority to decide it.

Cooling v. Department of Social Services (2016)

What the panel ruled

  • Reverse the denial of attorney’s fees and the circuit court’s amount; remand.

Support for this ruling: the panel, with both colleagues concurring.

What it could have ruled (the Division)

  • Affirm the Director’s denial, because Cooling was not the prevailing party in a contested case, because the Division was substantially justified, or because he did not show the special factors for the fees.

Support for the alternative: the Division’s three arguments on appeal.

In the Matter of S.J.M. (2015)

What the panel ruled

  • Reverse and remand: the probate order overlapped the divorce court’s custody judgment.

Support for this ruling: Judge Quigless, with Judge Norton concurring and Judge Richter concurring separately.

What it could have ruled (the mother)

  • Let the guardianship stand, as the probate court did when it denied the father’s motions to dismiss.

Support for the alternative: the probate court’s judgment. The parties agreed the son needed a guardian.

Act for Missouri's View

Everything in this box is our opinion.

Act for Missouri's position: retain Judge Quigless.

Retention is a vote on whether a judge has earned another 12-year term. We put the burden on the judge to show that she has, and we can only weigh what we were able to verify. When the evidence is thin, we lean toward not retaining. Here we reviewed 22 rulings across eleven different years and a wide range of subjects, which is a much larger sample than most. Below, we say for each one whether the law required the result, allowed either result, or did not support it, and where we might have gone the other way.

How we label a ruling

Law required this result We may be disappointed in the outcome, but the judge was right to rule as he or she did.

Law allowed either result Both readings have real support. The judge's choice shows how he or she weighs competing principles. It is not an error.

Law did not support this result The judge went beyond what the law allowed.

Keys v. City of St. Louis (2026)Law required this result

Our reading. A court cannot decide whether a rule is valid until someone has a real dispute over it. Keys had not been charged or penalized, and a ruling without a dispute is an advisory opinion. Changing the judgment to a dismissal was the correct form.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Quigless. We would like to see conflict-of-interest rules for elected officials tested and enforced, but the court could not do that here. If that matters to you, the remedy is the ballot, not the court.

Torre-Stewart v. Washington University (2026)Law allowed either result Law required this result

Our reading. Whether her breathing problems pleaded a legal “disability” was a close pleading question, and the law allowed either answer. Reviving the retaliation claim followed the rule that a retaliation claim stands apart from the discrimination claim it grew out of.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Quigless. The retaliation ruling protects an employee who complains, even when the complaint turns out not to meet the legal test. That is the kind of protection a worker who speaks up needs.

Lane v. City of St. Louis (2025)Law allowed either result

Our reading. The Constitution says charter proposals go to voters “by the lawmaking body.” She read “frame” by its ordinary meaning and held the Board does not have to draft them itself. That is a reasonable reading of the words.

Where we differ. We might have gone the other way. Lane’s reading, that the elected Board must originate charter changes, puts the decision with officials voters can hold accountable, and a close question about who controls the charter is one where we lean toward the more accountable body. We do not call her ruling an error. It rests on the text, and it is the kind of call the law leaves open.

C.M.G. v. B.M.C. (2025)Law required this result

Our reading. He knew another man was the biological father when he signed. The statute offers relief for a mistake of fact, and he alleged none. This is a ruling we chose by a fixed rule.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Quigless. A man who signs an acknowledgment of paternity knowing the facts has made a choice, and the child is entitled to the support that follows.

State v. Bromwell (2025)Law allowed either result

Our reading. The Supreme Court allows searches on consent from someone officers reasonably believe has authority, even if they were wrong. She applied that test and found the trial court’s “zero evidence” finding clearly erroneous. A different judge could have deferred to the trial judge, whose ruling the other way also had support.

Where we differ. We might have asked more of the officers. The consent covered the father’s home, but the search reached a back bedroom, and when police know the defendant stays there, we would have wanted a question or two before treating the father’s consent as covering it. She applied the rule as the Supreme Court wrote it, so we call this a judgment call, not an error.

State v. Yocco (2024)Law required this result Law allowed either result

Our reading. Setting aside ten life sentences that exceeded the maximum was required, and the State agreed. Reading “more than one victim” to include victims at different times was a judgment call, and she explained that Yocco’s reading would add a requirement the statute does not contain.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Quigless. She fixed a sentence that went beyond the statute, and she did not add words to it. The convictions on 16 counts and the sentences on the most serious ones stand.

J.R.C. v. S.L.F. (2024)Law allowed either result

Our reading. The review standard asks whether substantial evidence supports the order, and it favors the trial court. She found the testimony showed annoyance and no fear of physical harm. Another judge could have given the trial court more deference.

Where we differ. We do not differ with her approach. An order of protection restricts a person’s freedom and can have lasting effects, and holding the petitioner to the statute’s fear-of-harm standard is reasonable. Judges who defer more would also be on defensible ground.

Nexgen Silica v. DNR (2023)Law required this result Law allowed either result

Our reading. The statute requires the application to name everyone with an interest in the land and to carry their consent, and Nexgen’s did not. Denying fees because the state’s position was substantially justified was a judgment call.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Quigless. She held a permit applicant to the statute’s requirements and did not let the agency or the company fix the application after the fact.

In the Matter of Isreal (2023)Law required this result

Our reading. A court of appeals cannot find error without the record the lower court relied on, and no transcript of the first hearing existed. She wrote that his challenge looked meritorious, yet the court could not guess at the evidence.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Quigless. Guardianship takes a person’s freedom, and the court required a complete record before allowing it to stand. This ruling most closely tracks our values on individual liberty.

N.M.C. v. Highway Patrol (2023)Law required this result

Our reading. The statute allows one felony expungement in a lifetime and counts charged offenses as well as convictions. N.M.C. had two, one of which was dismissed after he completed drug court.

Where we differ. We are disappointed in the outcome. A man who completed drug court and had a charge dismissed lost the chance to clear it. But the statute is clear, and the judge was right to follow it. If the legislature wants a more generous rule, it can change the law.

State v. Sullivan (2022)Law required this result

Our reading. The right to a lawyer can be waived only knowingly, and the court must make sure the record shows it. This one did not.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Quigless. She protected a defendant’s constitutional right even in a minor case.

Planned Parenthood v. DSS (2021)Law required this result

Our reading. An appeal needs a final judgment, and this judgment left the amounts and fees to be set. The panel decided nothing about abortion, Medicaid funding, or the fee award. The underlying result came from the Missouri Supreme Court’s 2020 decision, which the State agreed controlled.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Quigless on the dismissal. Readers who disagree with the payment result should look to the Supreme Court decision and to the way the legislature wrote the budget language, not to this court.

In the Interest of J.R. (2021, dissent)Law allowed either result

Our reading. Both the majority and her dissent are defensible. She agreed the video should have come in, then asked whether it would have changed the outcome and found it would not, because three witnesses had said the same thing.

Where we differ. We do not differ with her method. She asks whether an error actually changed the result and defers to the trial judge on credibility, which fits her approach in other cases. A judge who believed the video would have mattered would also be reasonable.

R.H. v. Highway Patrol (2019)Law required this result

Our reading. Second-degree burglary is not on the statute’s list of offenses that cannot be expunged, and the respondents agreed.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Quigless. She read the statute the same way here as in N.M.C., by its plain words, even though the outcome favored the petitioner this time.

John Doe 122 v. Marianist Province (2019, dissent)Law allowed either result

Our reading. The majority held the evidence of prior knowledge was speculation. She found a real factual dispute, because the order’s own records used vague words and an expert explained that abuse is always described that way.

Where we differ. We think her reading is the better one. Knowledge is almost always proved by circumstantial evidence, and treating all of it as speculation means a survivor can never reach a jury. The majority was also applying a real rule against stacking inferences, so we call this a judgment call.

Kader v. Harris-Stowe (2018)Law required this result

Our reading. The instructions allowed the jury to find for Kader on acts that are not adverse employment actions, so a verdict could rest on an act that does not count. That is a prejudicial error, and a new trial is the remedy. This is a ruling we chose by a fixed rule.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Quigless, but readers should know what she did and did not decide. She did not find that Dr. Kader was treated fairly. She set aside a $2.5 million verdict because the instructions were wrong, and the case goes back for a new trial.

Li Lin v. Ellis and Washington University (2018)Law allowed either result

Our reading. Treating an accommodation request as protected activity relied on federal disability-law cases, and she then added a requirement that the jury find the request was made in good faith. Both steps were reasoned, and the law allowed other answers.

Where we differ. We might have gone the other way on the first step. The Missouri Human Rights Act’s text protects opposing discrimination and filing complaints. It does not mention requesting an accommodation. A judge who stays closest to the words might not have extended it. The second step, the good-faith finding, narrowed the claim and favored the employer.

State v. McEntire (2018, dissent)Law allowed either result

Our reading. The majority found a conflict of interest requiring reversal. She found that the supervisor’s contact with the informant was limited to bond and a dismissal, and that nothing was shared with the defender.

Where we differ. Both views are serious. The right to a lawyer free of conflicts matters, and the majority was cautious about appearances. Her point is that the record showed no shared confidences and no conflict. We do not differ with her method, and a fellow judge looking at the same facts reached the opposite result.

Jane Doe v. St. Louis Community College (2017)Law allowed either result

Our reading. The regulation requires “resident alien status, as determined by federal authority,” and DACA, by its own terms, grants no immigration status. Her answer on equal protection and preemption follows federal immigration law. The dissent has the best case for the other result: the college applied the rule differently for years, and the legislature declined to change it.

Where we differ. Readers will disagree about this ruling for reasons that go beyond the law. We do not differ with her method. She read the regulation by its words and decided no more than the case needed. The dissent’s point is a real one, and it shows the law allowed either result.

Armstrong-Trotwood v. State Tax Commission (2016)Law required this result

Our reading. The Constitution gives the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the construction of the state’s revenue laws. A lower court has no power to decide them.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Quigless. She sent the case where the Constitution says it belongs and did not decide it herself.

Cooling v. Department of Social Services (2016)Law allowed either result

Our reading. Whether the agency’s position was substantially justified is a judgment call, and she decided it against the agency. The facts included opening a case on an unverified application.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Quigless. A state agency that acts on an unverified claim and then loses should expect to answer for the cost, within what the fee statute allows.

In the Matter of S.J.M. (2015)Law required this result

Our reading. A probate court should not issue orders that overlap a divorce court’s existing custody judgment on the same issues and parties. This is a ruling we chose by a fixed rule.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Quigless. The case was about which court had authority, not about whether the son needed help.

What this adds up to. We reviewed 22 rulings. In 13 of them the main holding was one the law required, and in 12 she made a judgment call where the law allowed either result (some had both). In none of them did we find that the law did not support the result. Her approach is the text first, binding precedent, and the standard of review. It cut in different directions: against a state agency, a company, a university, and a petitioner; for a defendant, a survivor of abuse, and a man whose liberty was at stake. That fits a judge who is following the law and not a result.

Where we might have gone the other way. On three rulings we might have decided differently, and we say why above: Lane (we lean toward the more accountable body), Bromwell (we would have asked more of the officers), and Li Lin (we would have stayed closer to the statute’s words). In Doe 122 we agree with her dissent. We also note that in Kader and Li Lin she set aside employee verdicts over jury instructions, which some readers will weigh heavily. None of these is a case where the law did not support the result.

What limits this. Her term is about fourteen years and 22 rulings are a sample. We have no ruling from 2014 or 2020, and we read parts of some of the longer opinions, not every page. We looked for high-profile cases and found them, but we cannot rule out one we missed. We did not review ethics, temperament, or the quality of her writing. Intermediate appellate judges are bound by the Missouri Supreme Court and the statutes, which leaves less room to show independent judgment than a higher court has.

Why we land on retain. Our standard puts the burden on the judge, and we lean toward not retaining when the record is thin. This record is not thin. It spans eleven years and more than a dozen subjects, it includes the cases most likely to be controversial, and it shows a consistent method. We looked for a pattern of results the law did not support and did not find one. The places where we might differ are matters of judgment, and the law allowed her choices.

A disclosure. Act for Missouri opposed the 2024 Amendment 3 and opposes the 2026 Amendment 3 on this year's ballot. Neither measure bears on the 22 rulings above. We say so in case it matters to how you read the rest of this page.

What to do with this. Read the record and the alternatives first. The official committee evaluation is linked below. If you weigh the same facts differently, that is a reasonable position, and the vote is yours.

Sources

Every fact in The Record comes from the court opinions or official pages below. Read them yourself.

Last updated October 8, 2026.

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