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Should Judge Virginia W. Lay Be Retained?

Voters in the Eastern District will see this question on the November 3, 2026 ballot. We reviewed nine of her rulings. Here is what we found, what the court could have ruled instead, and where Act for Missouri comes down. We keep those three things separate so you can use the first two even if you disagree with the third.

Court
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District
Ballot question
“Shall Judge Virginia W. Lay be retained?” A majority of yes votes keeps her. This question appears on ballots in the Eastern District.
Appointed
Announced November 8, 2024, by Gov. Mike Parson (R), to the seat vacated by Judge Kurt S. Odenwald. Formal swearing-in ceremony April 4, 2025. This is her first retention vote.
Term if retained
12 years.
Official committee recommendation
The Missouri Judicial Performance Review Committee recommends retention. It made the same recommendation for all 50 judges it reviewed this year.

How this page works

The Record

Facts only. What the judge ruled, how colleagues voted, and links to the opinions. We say plainly when something is contested or when we have not reviewed it.

What the court could have ruled

The ruling as issued and a real alternative, each with its strongest support from the opinions. Every alternative points to a lower court's ruling, a party's argument, a dissent, or an earlier court decision.

Act for Missouri's View

Our opinion. We say which result we think better follows the law, and where the judge's choice shows a view different from ours. It is the only part of this page that is editorial.

Jump to: The Record • What the court could have ruled • Act for Missouri's View • Sources

The Record

Facts only

Background

Judge Lay joined the Eastern District in 2025. Before that she served three years as a circuit judge and two years as an associate circuit judge in St. Louis County (the 21st Judicial Circuit). Earlier she was an assistant circuit attorney in St. Louis, an assistant prosecutor in Jackson County, and an assistant attorney general. She also served as a special prosecutor for the Missouri Division of Employment Security, practiced employment and municipal law privately, and taught civil pretrial practice as an adjunct professor at Washington University School of Law. She earned her bachelor's degree at Columbia University and her law degree at Washington University. She serves on the executive board of St. Martha's, a nonprofit that assists victims of domestic violence.

What we reviewed so far

We have read nine rulings in full, from April 2025 to September 2026. She wrote all nine, and every one was decided by a unanimous panel. We chose seven because they touched government power, individual liberty, or a question where a judge has a real choice. The other two, the gun-possession case and the car-accident lawsuit against the city, were chosen by a fixed rule so our selection could not steer the result: they are her latest and earliest 2025 opinions that were not dismissals. Her record on this court is short. It runs about eighteen months, so nine rulings is a large share of it, but we cannot say what a longer record would show. In 2024 she appears on two opinions as a special judge. Those were written by another judge, and we did not count them.

Reads statutes and constitutions by their wordsVerified

In the expungement, injury-immunity, workers’ compensation, pension, and statute-of-limitations rulings, her analysis starts from the text, uses dictionary or earlier-case definitions for undefined terms, and declines to add words. In the expungement case she wrote that a court cannot “read into the Constitution words that are not there.”

Holds government to the law, and applies it for government when it requiresVerified

She ruled against a state commission in the workers’ compensation case and against a police pension board in the pension case, and she overturned a trial judge’s 50-year sentence that rested on charges no one had proven. She also ruled for the state conservation department and the City of St. Louis when the statute or binding precedent required it.

Protects the individual when the law requires itVerified

In the sentencing case she held that a judge cannot treat unproven, dismissed, or acquitted charges as fact, and she rejected the presumption that judges ignore improper evidence when the record shows the judge relied on it. In the pension case she rejected a board’s use of a factor that the law applies to a different question. In the workers’ compensation case she held that an employer who ignores a treatment demand pays for the care.

Follows binding precedent and decides narrowlyVerified

In the car-accident case she applied a Supreme Court ruling that treats a city sued only for its officer’s conduct the same as the officer, and she declined to decide a broader question. In the gun case she affirmed on the narrower ground and did not decide whether flight alone would be enough. In the tax-immunity case she left open that allowing hunting could, in other circumstances, be gross negligence.

Defers to fact-finders and enforces appeal rulesVerified

In the workers’ compensation case she accepted the Commission’s credibility findings for the first period and refused to award costs, saying the Commission uses that power with great caution. In the marijuana-licensing case she affirmed in part because arguments were not raised in the trial court.

Discretionary choices on remedy, fees, and procedureJudgment calls

In several rulings the law left her a choice: affirming the expungement despite the trial court’s error, sending the pension case back instead of ordering benefits, denying fees to the pension claimant, and declining to reassign the sentencing to a new judge. We label those below.

Applies the same approach each timeVerified, so far

Across nine rulings she applied the same method: the text, binding precedent, and the standard of review. That includes the two rulings we picked by a fixed rule, not for their subject. This still rests on nine rulings from about eighteen months.

Ethics, temperament, independence, clarity of writingNot yet reviewed

We have not independently reviewed these. The official committee evaluation is linked in the sources.

Ruling 1: The 2022 marijuana amendment and expungement (D.S. v. Missouri State Highway Patrol Criminal Records Repository, April 28, 2026)

The case. In 2022 voters approved a constitutional amendment (Amendment 3 that year, a different measure from the 2024 and 2026 Amendment 3s) that legalized recreational marijuana. It created two paths to expunge marijuana records. A person who is currently in prison, jail, or a halfway house can petition the sentencing court. For misdemeanors held by people no longer incarcerated, circuit courts were told to order expungement automatically within six months, by June 8, 2023. D.S. had a 2003 misdemeanor marijuana conviction. In February 2025, nearly twenty months after the deadline, he petitioned the court himself, and the trial court expunged the record. The Highway Patrol, which keeps the state’s criminal records, appealed.

The panel and the vote. Judge Wright (presiding), Judge Hess, and Judge Lay. Judge Lay wrote the opinion, and both concurred.

What the panel held.

  • The amendment’s petition process is limited to people currently incarcerated. People who are not incarcerated fall under the automatic process, so the trial court had no authority to hear D.S.’s petition.
  • The Highway Patrol said hundreds of thousands of records are affected and the courts would be flooded with petitions, but it presented no evidence of that at the trial court.
  • The error was harmless. D.S.’s conviction should have been expunged automatically by June 8, 2023, and reversing only to send the case back to reach the same result would be “absurd.”
  • D.S. could have sought expungement under a state statute, but that statute allows only three misdemeanor expungements, and he should not have to use one when the Constitution already directed the court to expunge.

The panel affirmed.

Ruling 2: A hunting-accident lawsuit against the state (Cay v. Polson and Missouri Department of Conservation, May 26, 2026)

The case. In May 2021 Fred Cay was running on a pedestrian trail in the Weldon Spring Conservation Area, which the Department of Conservation owns, when a turkey hunter shot him. He was flown by helicopter to a hospital and had multiple surgeries. He and his wife sued the hunter and the Department. The Department said Missouri’s Recreational Use Act shields landowners who open their land to the public free of charge, and the trial judge granted summary judgment for the Department. The claims against the hunter continue.

The panel and the vote. Judge Wright (presiding), Judge Hess, and Judge Lay. Judge Lay wrote the opinion, and both concurred.

What the panel held.

  • The Department met every element of the Act’s immunity: it owned the land, Cay entered it, free of charge, to run.
  • The Cays relied on the Act’s exception for gross negligence. Their only evidence was an expert’s affidavit saying the Department was grossly negligent and that injury was “foreseeable and inevitable.” The panel held those are legal conclusions, not facts, and the affidavit did not attach the materials it relied on.
  • The panel did not adopt the trial court’s view that allowing hunting can never be gross negligence. It wrote that it does not rule out that, in some circumstances, allowing hunting could qualify.
  • Mrs. Cay’s claim for loss of consortium depends on her husband’s claim, so it fails too.

The panel affirmed.

Ruling 3: A judgment for a man who was not a party (Hayes v. Miller, June 16, 2026)

The case. Laura Hayes and her siblings own a St. Louis house after their father died. She sued to eject John Miller, Jr., the person she believed was living there. At trial the man who participated was actually John Miller III, who lives across the street and had signed the answer as “Jr.” The occupant was his son. The trial court ordered Hayes to pay Miller III $28,796.08 on his counterclaim for unjust enrichment, for repairs and back taxes.

The panel and the vote. Judge Wright (presiding), Judge Lay, and Judge Hamilton. Judge Lay wrote the opinion, and both concurred.

What the panel held.

  • A trial court can grant relief only for or against parties to the suit, and Miller III was not a party. He did not own or occupy the property, and he never moved to join.
  • This was not a misnomer. The trial court chose a different person as the defendant.
  • Hayes did not agree to his participation. She objected before and after trial.
  • The panel vacated the judgment for Miller III. It did not reach whether the repair claim had merit.

A footnote notes that Miller III’s response to a post-trial motion contained several citations to cases that do not exist.

Ruling 4: A workers’ compensation case (Wills v. Fixture Contracting Co., September 29, 2026)

The case. Ronald Wills built cabinets and display fixtures. In 2017 he developed back pain from repeated lifting and was told by his employer’s controller to go to a workers’ compensation clinic. He left after waiting an hour and went elsewhere. In December 2017 he asked the insurer to call him. In February 2018 his lawyer sent a formal demand for surgery and followed up twice. The employer never responded. He had surgery on March 7, 2018, and a fusion that August, and he was fired on November 15, 2018. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission found his injury work-related and awarded disability benefits, but denied his past medical bills and his request for costs.

The panel and the vote. Judge Lay (presiding), Judge Quigless, and Judge Clark. Judge Lay wrote the opinion, and both concurred.

What the panel held.

  • The workers’ compensation statute gives an employer two choices when it receives a demand for treatment: refuse or ignore it and pay for reasonable, necessary care the employee later obtains, or grant it and keep control of the treatment.
  • The Commission had said it was not reasonable to expect the employer to evaluate the claim in three weeks. The statute contains no time to evaluate, so the Commission applied its own standard.
  • The Commission’s inference that the doctor’s lien agreement Wills signed showed he would have refused the employer’s care was speculation.
  • For the earlier period, October to December 2017, the Commission found he did not ask for treatment, and the panel will not re-weigh credibility.
  • On costs, the Commission has discretion under section 287.560 and is told to use it with great caution. The panel found no abuse because the employer offered some medical evidence and showed some concern for Wills.

The panel reversed on medical expenses after the February 14, 2018 demand, affirmed on everything else, and sent the case back for further proceedings.

Ruling 5: A medical marijuana licensing challenge (Missouri Medical Options v. Department of Health and Senior Services, December 23, 2025)

The case. In 2019 Missouri Medical Options applied for licenses to cultivate, manufacture, and dispense medical marijuana. The state denied every application based on a scoring system in its regulations. The company appealed to the Administrative Hearing Commission. After voters approved the 2022 amendment, the state rescinded the scoring rules in July 2023. In December 2024, while the appeal was pending, the company asked a circuit court to declare the old rules invalid and order the licenses issued. The court dismissed the petition as moot.

The panel and the vote. Judge Wright (presiding), Judge Hess, and Judge Lay. Judge Lay wrote the opinion, and both concurred.

What the panel held.

  • The first point was not preserved. The trial court never ruled on the claim the company wanted reviewed.
  • A challenge to rules the state has already rescinded is moot, because a ruling cannot give the company any relief.
  • The company raised its argument that rules apply retroactively for the first time on appeal.
  • A footnote observes that the company asked the court to strike one part of the old rule while keeping another part that helped it.

The panel affirmed. It did not decide whether the original denials were lawful.

Ruling 6: A police officer’s disability pension (Hauck v. Police Retirement System of St. Louis, September 2, 2025)

The case. Lt. Alana Hauck, a veteran of more than twenty years with the St. Louis police, was struck in the left arm by an object at a protest in July 2017 and later had shoulder and spinal surgery. She applied for service-connected disability retirement. The statute requires that her inability to work be the “natural, proximate, and exclusive result” of the accident. The retirement system agreed she was permanently unable to do her job but denied benefits, finding the injury was not the exclusive cause. It relied heavily on two doctors’ comments that she may have been magnifying her symptoms. The circuit court reversed, and the retirement system appealed.

The panel and the vote. Judge Wright (presiding), Judge Hess, and Judge Lay. Judge Lay wrote the opinion, and both concurred.

What the panel held.

  • Symptom magnification goes to whether a person is disabled. The board had already found Hauck unable to work, and her functional capacity exam found she gave full effort. At oral argument the retirement system agreed she was not magnifying.
  • The board found nothing besides symptom magnification to support its conclusion on exclusivity, and it misstated one doctor’s opinion on incapacity. Using that factor for exclusivity was unreasonable.
  • The panel did not decide whether the evidence otherwise supports the board’s decision. The board must reconsider exclusivity.
  • Hauck is not entitled to attorney’s fees, because the board’s position was substantially justified: the exclusivity requirement, added in 2009, had never been litigated.

The panel affirmed the circuit court and sent the case back to the retirement system to reconsider only whether her incapacity was the exclusive result of the accident.

Ruling 7: A 50-year sentence (State v. Harris, June 27, 2025)

The case. A jury convicted Desmond Harris of first-degree robbery, first-degree assault, and two counts of armed criminal action for shooting and robbing a man at his apartment in 2022. At sentencing the trial judge, without being asked, raised an earlier case in which Harris was acquitted of a carjacking in which a child was shot, and in which other charges had been dropped. The prosecutor summarized the charges and noted the acquittal. The judge said the earlier case showed “a series of bad decisions” and imposed consecutive sentences totaling 50 years. Harris also argued on appeal that a mistrial should have been granted when the victim said he recognized Harris from a news report about “another situation.”

The panel and the vote. Judge Page (presiding), Judge Lay, and Judge Navarro-McKelvey. Judge Lay wrote the opinion, and both concurred.

What the panel held.

  • The mistrial request failed. The victim’s remark was vague, it did not tie Harris to a specific crime, and the judge struck it and told the jury to disregard it.
  • A sentencing judge may consider conduct of which the defendant was acquitted only if it is proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Here nothing was proven. The prosecutor only paraphrased the charges, and a charge is not evidence that the defendant did it.
  • Judges are presumed not to consider improper evidence, but the record showed this judge relied on it: he raised it himself, discussed it, and then imposed sentence with no other stated reasons.
  • Harris asked for a different judge on remand. The panel declined to order that and said he can ask the circuit court under Rule 32.09(c).

The panel affirmed the convictions and sent the case back for resentencing only.

Ruling 8: A felon in possession of a gun (State v. Rivers, December 30, 2025)

The case. Police found Jayelyn Rivers in the front passenger seat of a parked car after midnight with three others. They cited the group for violating curfew. Rivers was patted down, and no weapon was found. After he was told he was under arrest, he ran. An officer then saw the handle and extended magazine of a gun sticking out from under his seat. He was convicted by a jury of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon and resisting arrest, and sentenced to seven years on the gun count. He argued the evidence did not show he possessed the gun, since the others in the car had access to it.

The panel and the vote. Judge Wright (presiding), Judge Hess, and Judge Lay. Judge Lay wrote the opinion, and both concurred.

What the panel held.

  • The state’s evidence was enough for a jury to find actual possession. The gun was under his seat, within easy reach, in plain view, and the officer testified Rivers had superior access.
  • Where people share a space, some additional fact must tie the accused to the contraband. Easy access, the gun’s visibility, and his flight each did.
  • Rivers said he fled because he feared a probation violation, but probation appeared only in lawyers’ statements, which are not evidence.
  • The panel did not decide whether flight alone would be enough.

The panel affirmed.

Ruling 9: A lawsuit against a police officer and the city (Bailey v. City of St. Louis, April 1, 2025)

The case. On March 27, 2019, an on-duty St. Louis police officer, Brendan Byers, rear-ended Deborah Bailey’s car. She sued him and the City on March 31, 2023, more than four years later. The City and the officer moved to dismiss, saying the three-year limit in section 516.130 applies to claims against “sheriffs, coroners, or other officers.” Bailey said the five-year personal-injury limit applies. The trial court dismissed both claims.

The panel and the vote. Judge Page (presiding), Judge Lay, and Judge Navarro-McKelvey. Judge Lay wrote the opinion, and both concurred.

What the panel held.

  • An officer on patrol is an “other officer” acting in his official capacity, and Bailey’s own petition said he acted within the scope of his employment.
  • The statute does not list cities, and Bailey was right about that. But the Missouri Supreme Court held in 2007 that a government entity can be an “officer” under this statute when it is sued for the acts of its employee, and a claim against an employer based on its employee’s conduct cannot outlive the claim against the employee.
  • The panel did not decide whether the City would be covered if Bailey had sued it on some independent claim.

The panel affirmed.

What the court could have ruled

The ruling as issued and a real alternative. Not our conclusion.

For each ruling, the alternative below is one that a judge, a trial court, or a party actually argued. Neither column is our conclusion. That comes in the next section.

D.S. v. Highway Patrol (2026)

What the panel ruled (3-0)

  • Only people currently incarcerated may petition under the amendment, so the trial court had no authority to hear D.S.’s petition.
  • The error was harmless because D.S. was owed automatic expungement anyway.
  • Reversing would only send the case back to reach the same result.

Support for this ruling: three judges, unanimous.

What it could have ruled (the Highway Patrol and the trial court)

  • Reverse. The Highway Patrol asked the court to vacate the expungement because the trial court acted outside its authority.
  • Or affirm on the trial court’s view that D.S. could petition for expungement under the amendment, which is the reading the panel rejected.

Support for the alternative: the Highway Patrol’s appeal and the trial court’s judgment.

Cay v. Polson and Department of Conservation (2026)

What the panel ruled (3-0)

  • The Recreational Use Act made the Department immune because the land was free to enter and used for recreation.
  • The expert’s opinions of gross negligence were legal conclusions, so they did not create a dispute of fact.
  • Left open that allowing hunting could be gross negligence in other circumstances.

Support for this ruling: three judges, unanimous.

What it could have ruled (the Cays)

  • Treat the expert’s affidavit as enough to create a jury question on whether the Department was grossly negligent.
  • Reverse summary judgment and let a jury decide whether placing hunters near popular trails was grossly negligent.

Support for the alternative: the Cays’ argument on appeal. The panel said gross negligence is the only exception they raised.

Hayes v. Miller (2026)

What the panel ruled (3-0)

  • A court can grant relief only for or against a party. Miller III was not a party.
  • Choosing a different person as defendant was not a misnomer.
  • Hayes had not agreed to his participation. She objected at trial and afterward.

Support for this ruling: three judges, unanimous.

What it could have ruled (Miller III)

  • Treat the mix-up as a harmless misnomer, since the right man was in court and took part.
  • Hold that Hayes accepted his participation and could not complain on appeal.

Support for the alternative: Miller III’s arguments, which the panel rejected.

Wills v. Fixture Contracting (2026)

What the panel ruled (3-0)

  • Reverse the denial of past medical bills after the February 2018 demand, because the statute gives an employer no time to evaluate.
  • Affirm everything else, including the finding that Wills did not ask for treatment earlier and the denial of costs.

Support for this ruling: three judges, unanimous.

What it could have ruled (the Commission and the employer)

  • Affirm the Commission: it was not reasonable to expect the employer to evaluate a surgery demand in three weeks.
  • Treat the doctor’s lien agreement as proof that Wills had decided not to use the employer’s care.
  • On the other side, Wills asked for costs against the employer, which the Commission could have granted.

Support for the alternative: the Commission’s decision and the employer’s argument on appeal; Wills’s request for costs.

Missouri Medical Options v. DHSS (2025)

What the panel ruled (3-0)

  • The challenge to rescinded rules is moot.
  • The first and third points were not preserved.

Support for this ruling: three judges, unanimous.

What it could have ruled (the company)

  • Reach the merits, because the company said a ruling would affect its pending licensing appeal.
  • Apply the new rules to its old applications, which the company argued is proper for procedural rules.

Support for the alternative: the company’s arguments on appeal. The panel said the retroactivity argument was raised too late.

Hauck v. Police Retirement System (2025)

What the panel ruled (3-0)

  • Symptom magnification cannot be used to decide exclusivity.
  • Send the case back so the board can reconsider exclusivity without it.
  • Deny attorney’s fees because the board’s position was substantially justified.

Support for this ruling: three judges, unanimous.

What it could have ruled (the board and Hauck)

  • Uphold the board, as the retirement system argued, because the medical evidence of other causes supported its decision.
  • Go further, as Hauck argued, and hold that the evidence shows her incapacity was exclusively caused by the accident, so benefits are owed now.
  • Award attorney’s fees under section 536.087, as Hauck requested.

Support for the alternative: the board’s and Hauck’s arguments on appeal.

State v. Harris (2025)

What the panel ruled (3-0)

  • The sentencing judge relied on charges that were not proven, so Harris must be resentenced.
  • The convictions stand, and the mistrial was properly denied.
  • A new judge is not ordered; Harris can ask the circuit court.

Support for this ruling: three judges, unanimous.

What it could have ruled (the State)

  • Treat the prior charges as the kind of history sentencing judges routinely consider, as the State argued, citing cases on police reports and pre-sentence reports.
  • Presume the judge did not rely on improper evidence, as the State argued.
  • On Harris’s side, order resentencing before a different judge.

Support for the alternative: the State’s brief and the cases it cited, which the panel found did not fit; and Harris’s request.

State v. Rivers (2025)

What the panel ruled (3-0)

  • The evidence supported actual possession of the gun.
  • Flight was one of the facts tying Rivers to the gun, and probation was not in evidence.
  • Decide on actual possession and leave open whether flight alone would be enough.

Support for this ruling: three judges, unanimous.

What it could have ruled (Rivers)

  • Hold the evidence insufficient because others in the car had access to the gun, so the State needed more than his flight.
  • Treat his claim that he fled out of fear of a probation violation as an equally likely explanation, as a 2002 Western District case did for an immigration-status explanation.

Support for the alternative: Rivers’s argument and State v. Franco-Amador, which the panel said does not apply because the gun was in plain view.

Bailey v. City of St. Louis (2025)

What the panel ruled (3-0)

  • The three-year limit applies to the officer, who was acting in his official role.
  • The Supreme Court’s 2007 decision lets a government entity count as an “officer” when sued only for its employee’s conduct, so it applies to the City too.

Support for this ruling: three judges, unanimous.

What it could have ruled (Bailey)

  • Apply the five-year personal-injury limit, since the statute does not name cities and the officer’s driving was not an official act.
  • Follow a 2007 Southern District case that refused to extend the three-year limit to a county and its commissioners.

Support for the alternative: Bailey’s argument and Cox v. Ripley County. The panel said Cox involved no individual officer, unlike this case.

Act for Missouri's View

Everything in this box is our opinion.

Act for Missouri's position: retain Judge Lay.

Retention is a vote on whether a judge has earned another 12-year term. We put the burden on the judge to show that she has, and we can only weigh what we were able to verify. When the evidence is thin, we lean toward not retaining. Here we reviewed nine rulings across nine different kinds of cases, so the evidence is not thin, but the record is short. Below is how we read each ruling.

How we label a ruling

Law required this result We may be disappointed in the outcome, but the judge was right to rule as he or she did.

Law allowed either result Both readings have real support. The judge's choice shows how he or she weighs competing principles. It is not an error.

Law did not support this result The judge went beyond what the law allowed.

D.S. v. Highway Patrol (2026)Law required this result Law allowed either result

Our reading. The two labels cover two parts of the ruling. That only people in custody can petition is what the amendment’s text says. The choice to affirm anyway, on harmless error, was one the law allowed either way, and we think it was sensible. Reversing would only have sent D.S. back to a court that had to expunge his record.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Lay. A court should not add words to a constitutional amendment, even one voters passed, and she did not. This amendment, from 2022, is a different measure from the 2024 and 2026 Amendment 3s that we opposed.

Cay v. Polson and Department of Conservation (2026)Law required this result

Our reading. The Recreational Use Act gives landowners who open their land free of charge immunity, with narrow exceptions. The Cays’ only evidence for the gross-negligence exception was an expert’s conclusions. A court cannot treat conclusions as facts. She also declined to say allowing hunting could never be gross negligence.

Where we differ. We are disappointed in the outcome. A man was shot while running on a public trail. But the judge applied the law as written, and the frustration belongs with the statute, not the judge. If the legislature wants public land to carry more liability, it can change the Act.

Hayes v. Miller (2026)Law required this result

Our reading. A court can give a judgment only to a party. The trial court gave $28,796 to a man who was not one. The owner objected throughout.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Lay. This ruling protects a property owner from a judgment against her in favor of someone who was never in the case.

Wills v. Fixture Contracting (2026)Law required this result Law allowed either result

Our reading. Reversing the denial of medical bills after the demand was required: the statute gives an employer two options and no time to think. The Commission was applying its own standard, and she said so. Affirming the denial of costs was a judgment call that the law left to the Commission, and she deferred.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Lay on either part. Holding an agency to the statute’s words, and an employer to the choice the statute gives it, protects an injured worker. Deferring on costs follows the rule that courts should not substitute their judgment for the Commission’s on facts.

Missouri Medical Options v. DHSS (2025)Law required this result

Our reading. The old rules were gone, so a ruling about them could not help the company, and its other arguments were raised too late. A footnote suggests the company wanted the favorable parts of the old rules and not the rest.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Lay. This ruling does not say whether the original license denials were fair. The panel did not reach that question, so we are not judging it either.

Hauck v. Police Retirement System (2025)Law required this result Law allowed either result

Our reading. The board used a factor about whether she was disabled to decide what caused the disability. That was a legal error, and the board had already found her disabled. Sending the case back, instead of ordering benefits, left the question of what caused her injuries to the agency that has the medical evidence. Denying fees was also a close call: the exclusivity rule was new to the courts.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Lay. She ruled against a government board in favor of an injured officer, and she did not go beyond what she was asked to decide. Leaving the board to reconsider keeps the court in its role.

State v. Harris (2025)Law required this result Law allowed either result

Our reading. A sentencing judge may use unproven charges only if they are proven by a preponderance of the evidence, and nothing was. The record showed the judge relied on them, so the presumption that judges ignore improper evidence did not apply. Denying the mistrial and declining to order a new sentencing judge were discretionary calls, and she explained both.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Lay, and this is the ruling that most closely tracks our values. A person is entitled to be punished for what was proven, and a 50-year sentence cannot rest on charges a jury rejected or the State dropped. The convictions stood, so she did not excuse the crime.

State v. Rivers (2025)Law required this result

Our reading. The gun was under his seat in plain view, and he ran. Under the standard of review the court asks only whether a reasonable jury could convict. She decided the case on the narrower ground and did not rule on whether flight alone is enough. The probation explanation was not in evidence. We chose this ruling by a fixed rule.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Lay. She applied the standard of review as written and decided no more than she had to.

Bailey v. City of St. Louis (2025)Law required this result

Our reading. The Supreme Court has held that a government entity sued for its employee’s official conduct is treated as an “officer” under the three-year statute. A lower court cannot depart from that. She also noted the statute does not list cities and left the broader question open. We chose this ruling by a fixed rule.

Where we differ. We are disappointed in the outcome, since the injured driver lost on timing. But the court was bound by the Supreme Court’s decision. If the legislature wants longer deadlines for claims against cities, it can change the statute.

What this adds up to. We reviewed nine rulings. In all nine, the main holding was one the law required, and in four of them (D.S., Wills, Hauck, and Harris) she also made a discretionary choice on a remedy, fees, or procedure where the law allowed either result. In each of those we agree with her choice. We found no ruling where we thought the law did not support her result, and none where we would have chosen differently. She ruled for individuals in some cases and for government in others, and in each she started from the text, followed binding precedent, and decided no more than she had to. The ruling in Harris, where she overturned a 50-year sentence that rested on unproven charges, is the one that best shows how she treats a person’s liberty. The ruling in Cay, where she held for the state against a seriously injured man, shows she does not rule for the sympathetic party when the law says otherwise.

What limits this. Her record on this court is about eighteen months, so nine rulings cover much of it, but it is still short. All nine were unanimous panels, so we have not seen her disagree with colleagues. Intermediate appellate judges are bound by the Missouri Supreme Court, which limits how much of a judge’s own view shows in the rulings. None of the nine involved a contested political or social question. We chose seven by their subject, which could tilt our sample, and we chose two by a fixed rule to check that. We did not review her conduct, temperament, or her work as a circuit judge. If a longer record or a high-profile case shows something different, that would matter.

Why we land on retain. Our standard puts the burden on the judge, and we lean toward not retaining when the record is thin. On this record the judge has carried that burden. We looked for a pattern of results the law did not support and did not find one. We also found no ruling that shows a view of the law that differs from ours. She was appointed by a Republican governor, and we put no weight on that. What mattered to us is that she follows the text and the facts.

A disclosure. Act for Missouri opposed the 2024 Amendment 3 and opposes the 2026 Amendment 3 on this year's ballot. Neither measure bears on the nine rulings above. The D.S. ruling concerns the 2022 marijuana amendment, which was also numbered Amendment 3 that year and is a different measure.

What to do with this. Read the record and the alternatives first. The official committee evaluation is linked below. If you weigh the same facts differently, that is a reasonable position, and the vote is yours.

Sources

Every fact in The Record comes from the court opinions or official pages below. Read them yourself.

Last updated October 8, 2026.

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