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Should Judge Lisa White Hardwick Be Retained?

Voters in the Western District will see this question on the November 3, 2026 ballot. We reviewed twelve of her rulings. Here is what we found, what the court could have ruled instead, and where Act for Missouri comes down. We keep those three things separate so you can use the first two even if you disagree with the third.

Court
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District
Ballot question
“Shall Judge Lisa White Hardwick be retained?” A majority of yes votes keeps her. This question appears on ballots in the Western District.
Appointed
May 2001, by Gov. Bob Holden (D). Retained in 2002 and 2014.
Current term ends
December 31, 2026. A new term is 12 years.
Official committee recommendation
The Missouri Judicial Performance Review Committee recommends retention. It made the same recommendation for all 50 judges it reviewed this year.

How this page works

The Record

Facts only. What the judge ruled, how colleagues voted, and links to the opinions. We say plainly when something is contested or when we have not reviewed it.

What the court could have ruled

The ruling as issued and a real alternative, each with its strongest support from the opinions. Every alternative points to a dissent, a statute's text, or a later court decision.

Act for Missouri's View

Our opinion. We say which result we think better follows the law, and where the judge's choice shows a view different from ours. It is the only part of this page that is editorial.

Jump to: The Record • What the court could have ruled • Act for Missouri's View • Sources

The Record

Facts only

Background

Judge Hardwick was appointed to the Western District in May 2001 and served as chief judge from 2010 to 2012. Before that she was a circuit judge in Jackson County (the 16th Circuit) from January 2000 to May 2001. She was a partner at Shook, Hardy & Bacon from 1992 to 2000 and an associate there from 1985 to 1991, and she was elected to the Jackson County Legislature, serving from 1993 to 2000. She earned her bachelor's degree at the University of Missouri and her law degree at Harvard. By January 2017, according to her application to the Appellate Judicial Commission, she had authored 825 opinions.

What we reviewed so far

We have read twelve rulings in full, from 2016 to 2025. She wrote seven of them. In the other five she was a member of the panel and joined an opinion written by another judge, presiding in four of them. We chose most of the rulings because they touch government power, ballot law, taxes, utilities, civil rights, or open government. Two, the parental-rights case and the insurance case from 2023, were chosen by a fixed rule so our selection could not steer the result: the first two opinions she wrote in the 2023 list that we had not already picked. That is a small part of a record that runs to well over 800 opinions, so we say below what we could and could not evaluate.

Reads statutes and regulations by their wordsVerified

In the opinions she wrote on the tax lien, the clean-water permit, the utility financing, and the campaign-finance penalty, the analysis starts from the statute's or regulation's text, uses dictionary definitions for undefined terms, and declines to add exceptions or penalties the legislature did not write.

Holds government to the limits of its authorityVerified

In the tax-lien case she held that the state could not enforce a lien past the statute's ten-year limit. In the clean-water case she held that the agency had no power to fix an applicant's error on its own. In the utility case the panel held that the Commission followed the limits the statute set. In the Cooper County case the panel held that a county clerk's duty to extend a city's taxes must come from a statute, and none existed.

Stays within precedent and the legislature's evident intentContested

She followed Supreme Court precedent closely in the clean-water, post-conviction, and discovery opinions. In Blue Springs, the panel's reading of the 2019 footnotes and its use of Bostock is the contested part. In Fitz-James, whether the panel gave the Secretary of State enough room to describe the measure is the contested part.

Restraint toward the initiative processContested

In Fitz-James the panel said courts must act with restraint in the initiative process and will not rule on a measure's wisdom or on whether it would conflict with other laws. It then affirmed most of a trial court's rewrite of the Secretary's language.

Respects parental rightsVerified

In the 2023 parental-rights case she wrote, the panel reversed a grandmother's court-ordered visits. Parents are presumed fit, and a close and beneficial grandparent relationship is not enough to overcome that. The panel refused to add words to the statute to lower the bar.

Applies procedural rules evenlyContested

In the Sunshine Law case the panel held citizen plaintiffs to the court's briefing rules and deferred to the trial judge, and a dissenting judge said that standard was too exacting. In the post-conviction case she enforced a filing deadline the same way.

Applies the same approach each timeVerified, so far

Across twelve rulings spanning nine years she applied the same method: the text, binding precedent, and the standard of review. That includes the two rulings we picked by a fixed rule, not for their subject. This still rests on twelve rulings out of well over 800.

Ethics, temperament, independence, clarity of writingNot yet reviewed

We have not independently reviewed these. The official committee evaluation is linked in the sources.

Ruling 1: Director of Revenue v. Miller (December 16, 2025)

The case. In 2010 the Department of Revenue filed a certificate of tax lien against George Miller for about $9,600 and filed it with the circuit clerk in Nodaway County. In January 2025 the department had his wages garnished to collect it, by then about $11,100 with interest and penalties. Miller argued the lien had expired after ten years. The trial judge denied his motion to quash the garnishment.

The panel and the vote. Judge Gabbert (presiding), Judge Hardwick, and Judge Mitchell heard the appeal. Judge Hardwick wrote the opinion, and all concurred.

What the panel held.

  • The tax lien statute says a certificate filed with the circuit clerk has the “full force and effect of a default judgment” and is executed like other judgments. Missouri presumes a judgment paid after ten years unless it is revived, so the same limit applies to the certificate.
  • The department never revived the certificate, so it could not use the garnishment remedy after February 22, 2020.
  • Reading in an exemption for the state would add words the legislature did not write.
  • The department's constitutional objection fails. The ten-year limit ends one collection remedy, not the debt, and the statute says the department's remedies are cumulative, so it can still use others.

The panel reversed and sent the case back with directions to quash the garnishment.

Ruling 2: A Sunshine Law case (Citizens for Transparency and Accountability v. Western Cass Fire Protection District, July 22, 2025)

The case. Two of the five board members of the Western Cass Fire Protection District, joined by a group they formed, sued the district, its board, and three other board members in Cass County under the Sunshine Law, Missouri's open-meetings and open-records law. Their petition alleged more than 40 violations at twelve board meetings and in nine email exchanges, including inadequate notice, discussion of items outside the posted agenda, and improper closed sessions. After the plaintiffs presented their evidence over seven days of trial, the trial judge ruled for the district.

The panel and the vote. Judge Chapman (presiding) wrote the opinion, and Judge Hardwick concurred. Judge Ahuja dissented in a separate opinion. The vote was 2-1. Judge Hardwick joined the opinion but did not write it.

What the majority held.

  • When a trial judge rules for a defendant after the plaintiff's evidence in a case tried without a jury, the judge has weighed the evidence and credibility, so the appeals court defers to those findings.
  • The record did not show which of the district's arguments the trial judge relied on. The plaintiffs therefore had to challenge every ground that could support the judgment, and they did not.
  • Many of the plaintiffs' points on appeal lumped together several different rulings, lacked record citations, or omitted required statements, so they preserved nothing for review.
  • The two board members had sued over actions they took part in or approved as directors, and one gave confusing and evasive testimony about the group they formed.

The panel affirmed. Because most of the points preserved nothing for review, the opinion does not resolve most of the individual alleged violations.

Ruling 3: The Blue Springs school case (R.M.A. v. Blue Springs R-IV School District, June 4, 2024)

The case. A student who was born female and transitioned to living as male sued a school district under the Missouri Human Rights Act. The district had denied him access to the boys' restrooms and locker room. In 2019 the Missouri Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Wilson, held that his petition stated a claim and sent the case to trial. In December 2021 a jury found the district liable and awarded $175,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages. The trial judge set the verdict aside and conditionally ordered a new trial.

The panel and the vote. Judge Hardwick (presiding), Judge Alok Ahuja, and Judge Anthony Rex Gabbert, who wrote the opinion. The opinion ends “All concur.” There was no dissent and no separate opinion. Judge Hardwick joined the opinion but did not write it.

What the panel held.

  • It was constitutionally bound to follow the Supreme Court's most recent controlling decision, and it could not question that decision's correctness.
  • It read the 2019 opinion's footnotes as holding that “sex” in the Act is not limited to biological sex and that an amended birth certificate could establish a person's sex.
  • The jury had enough evidence that the student is male, including his amended birth certificate and his doctor's testimony.
  • The district's argument that it acted because of the student's female genitalia itself showed discrimination because of sex. The panel treated this as sex stereotyping and cited Price Waterhouse and Bostock as instructive.
  • The trial judge's order for a new trial was an abuse of discretion, because it rested on a legal view the panel rejected.
  • The evidence supported punitive damages: the district followed an unwritten policy of using birth certificates, then declined to say it would honor a corrected one, and did not change its position for years.

The panel reversed and sent the case back with instructions to enter judgment on the jury's verdict. What happened next. The Missouri Supreme Court took the case and decided it the other way on June 10, 2025. By a 5-2 vote it held that “sex” in the Act means biological sex and affirmed the trial judge. In doing so it described the 2019 decision as having declined to define “sex.” Justice Wilson and Judge Powell dissented.

Ruling 4: A school harassment discovery case (State ex rel. L.O. v. Hansbrough, December 19, 2023)

The case. A Black student sued the Platte County School District under the Missouri Human Rights Act over racial harassment. A student had shared a document containing racial slurs with every student in the district, and nooses had been found in a high school bathroom both before and after that incident. The trial judge struck the noose allegations from the petition and refused all discovery about them, saying they were irrelevant. The student asked the Court of Appeals for an extraordinary writ.

The panel and the vote. Judge Hardwick (presiding), Judge Pfeiffer, who wrote the opinion, and Judge Thomson. All concurred. Judge Hardwick joined the opinion but did not write it.

What the panel held.

  • It left in place the trial judge's ruling striking the noose allegations from the petition, because the amended petition stated a claim without them.
  • It held the refusal of any discovery on the noose incidents was a clear abuse of discretion. A school district can be liable if it knew or should have known of harassment and failed to respond promptly, so how the district handled the noose incidents bears on that question.
  • Discovery is broader than what is admissible at trial, and the Supreme Court has held that other incidents can be relevant to proving discriminatory intent.
  • The state commission's refusal to issue a right to sue on those incidents did not make evidence about them irrelevant.

The panel made its preliminary order permanent and told the trial judge to allow the requested discovery, subject to student-privacy protections. It said its relief was extraordinary.

Ruling 5: A parental-rights case (Payne v. Nilsson, November 21, 2023)

The case. A grandmother who lives in the St. Louis area asked a court to order visits with her young grandson, who lives with his parents in Kirksville. After an argument with the child's mother in December 2021, the parents stopped letting her see him in person. The trial judge awarded her a weekend every other month and a week in the summer. The parents appealed.

The panel and the vote. Judge Hardwick (presiding), Judge Mitchell, and Judge Martin. Judge Hardwick wrote the opinion, and all concurred.

What the panel held.

  • Under Missouri's third-party visitation statute, a court starts from a presumption that a child's parents are fit and make decisions consistent with the child's welfare.
  • To overcome that presumption, the grandmother had to prove that each parent was unfit or that the child's welfare requires the visits, which means special or extraordinary circumstances. That is a separate requirement from showing the visits would be in the child's best interests.
  • A close and beneficial grandparent relationship, which the record showed, does not by itself prove the child's welfare requires it.
  • The parents' testimony that they were open to some contact, and their failure to file an answer, were not admissions that the child's welfare required visitation.
  • The statute draws no line between visitation and custody. Adopting a lower standard for visitation would add words to the statute, which a court may not do.

The panel reversed. It did not reach the parents' other arguments about the grandmother's standing and whether her petition stated a claim.

Ruling 6: The 2023 abortion-amendment ballot summary (Fitz-James v. Ashcroft, October 31, 2023)

The case. In 2023, Dr. Anna Fitz-James submitted six versions of an initiative petition to add a right to reproductive freedom to the Missouri Constitution. The Secretary of State wrote the summary statements that would appear on the ballot. The Cole County trial judge found them insufficient and unfair and rewrote them. The Secretary appealed. This case concerned the 2024 Amendment 3 petition.

The panel and the vote. Judge Hardwick (presiding), Judge Ardini, and Judge Chapman, who wrote the opinion. All concurred. Judge Hardwick joined the opinion but did not write it.

What the panel held.

  • It said courts must act with restraint in the initiative process, will not judge a measure's wisdom, and will not issue advisory opinions on whether a measure conflicts with other laws. With undisputed facts, it reviewed the legal questions fresh.
  • It held that several of the Secretary's phrases misdescribed the probable effects of the petitions. For example, it found that unrestricted abortion through all nine months of pregnancy was not a probable effect, because every version allows some regulation and requires a good-faith health judgment comparable to existing law.
  • It affirmed the trial judge's finding that other phrases were unfair, including the language about nullifying existing law and the language about the legislature's authority after the first 24 weeks or after viability.
  • It held the trial judge did not exceed his authority in rewriting the summaries. It rejected the Secretary's argument for only minimal changes, saying the argument lacked legal support.
  • It reversed in two respects. The trial judge should have included language on the petitions' nondiscrimination provision, and for one version he should have said it would remove the ban on abortion “at any stage of gestation.”

The panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and certified its own alternative summary statements to the Secretary of State.

Ruling 7: A car-insurance benefits case (Perea v. Progressive Northwestern Insurance, October 31, 2023)

The case. Janet Perea, a Kansas resident insured under a Kansas auto policy, was injured in a 2019 crash and had $4,500 in personal-injury-protection benefits for medical bills. She had signed an assignment of benefits to her chiropractor and hired an attorney for 45% of any proceeds. The insurer paid part of the benefits to the chiropractor and the rest in one check made out to her and her lawyer. They sued, claiming the insurer paid late and owed interest and attorney's fees, that paying the chiropractor violated Missouri's ban on assigning personal-injury claims, and that it violated the attorney lien statute. The trial judge ruled for the insurer.

The panel and the vote. Judge Hardwick (presiding), Judge Martin, and Judge Gabbert. Judge Hardwick wrote the opinion, and all concurred.

What the panel held.

  • Kansas law governs a claim under a Kansas policy. The payments came after Kansas's 30-day deadline, but the Kansas statute lets an insurer delay when it has reasonable proof it may not be responsible. The insurer delayed to confirm that the other driver's insurer had not already paid the medical bills, which would have ended its obligation. Because the delay was justified, no interest or fees were owed.
  • Kansas allows the assignment of these benefits to a medical provider, and the assignment was therefore enforceable. Missouri's ban on assigning personal-injury claims did not apply.
  • The attorney lien claim failed. After the assignment, the claim for those charges belonged to the chiropractor, so the insurer could not cut its payment by the lawyer's fee. For the remainder, the insurer followed the lawyer's own instruction to issue one check to both of them.

The panel affirmed.

Ruling 8: The utility financing case (Empire District Electric / Liberty, August 1, 2023)

The case. Liberty, a southwest Missouri electric utility, asked the Public Service Commission to let it recover two sets of costs through bonds paid by customers over time: about $193 million in fuel and purchased-power costs from Winter Storm Uri, and costs tied to retiring its Asbury coal plant. The commission approved about $290 million including financing costs, roughly $72 million less than Liberty asked. Liberty appealed.

The panel and the vote. Judge Gabbert (presiding), Judge Hardwick, and Judge Pfeiffer. Judge Hardwick wrote the opinion, and all concurred.

What the panel held. It affirmed the commission on every point. The commission followed the statute in crediting customers with the plant's deferred tax balance and in disallowing 5% of the storm fuel and purchased-power costs, in line with the 95/5 cost-sharing arrangement the utility normally operates under. It also set the carrying charges at the utility's long-term debt rate, which leaves out the return shareholders would otherwise earn. The panel also rejected a motion by the state's consumer advocate to dismiss the appeal as untimely.

Ruling 9: A campaign-finance enforcement case (Missouri Ethics Commission v. LeVota, December 14, 2021)

The case. Philip LeVota was a consultant paid by a campaign committee called the Show-Me Council. He withdrew $4,000 in cash from the committee's account and bought a cashier's check to pay his business credit card, wrote himself a $950 check made out to “cash,” and withdrew $360 in cash that he gave to a charity he later helped incorporate. The committee's treasurer, his wife, said she had authorized each payment. The Missouri Ethics Commission found that he violated two campaign-finance laws and ordered two $10,000 fees. The Administrative Hearing Commission disagreed and found he had broken no law. The circuit court reversed the Hearing Commission and sided with the Ethics Commission. The Ethics Commission appealed.

The panel and the vote. Judge Hardwick (presiding), Judge Witt, and Judge Ardini. Judge Hardwick wrote the opinion, and all concurred.

What the panel held.

  • The law requires committee spending over $50 to be made by check signed by the treasurer, and it bars checks payable to “cash.” The Hearing Commission had held that only the treasurer can be held liable. The panel disagreed: the law lets the state penalize “any person” who makes an expenditure in violation of the chapter, and it defines “person” broadly. LeVota therefore violated the check-signing rule, even though the treasurer approved the payments.
  • It upheld the Hearing Commission's finding that LeVota did not use committee money for personal purposes. The payments were for allowable purposes: money owed to him for his services, and a gift to a charity.
  • It said it did not need to decide whether the Ethics Commission had to plead certain facts as an affirmative defense, because the Ethics Commission offered no evidence to carry its burden on that point anyway.

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part. It sent the case back so the Ethics Commission could set the penalty for the check-signing violation.

Ruling 10: A county-government pay and duty case (Cooper County Clerk Herman v. Cooper County Commission, November 23, 2021)

The case. Since 1991 the City of Boonville had paid the Cooper County clerk and collector, under a contract, to extend and collect its city taxes, in addition to their salaries. In 2018 the city signed a new contract with the collector only, which did not mention the clerk or pay her. The county commission then told the newly elected clerk, Sarah Herman, that extending the city's taxes was part of her statutory duties, that the old contract had ended, and that she could not be paid extra. It ordered the money Boonville had paid for her work refunded. The clerk and the city sued. The trial judge ruled for the commission on every count.

The panel and the vote. Judge Hardwick (presiding), Judge Witt, and Judge Ardini, who wrote the opinion. All concurred. Judge Hardwick joined the opinion but did not write it.

What the panel held.

  • The statute requires a county clerk to extend taxes for political subdivisions “authorized by law” to send their levies to the county. Reading it with the other tax statutes, which impose that duty clearly on fire districts, school districts, and water districts, the panel held it does not reach a city. A clerk therefore has no statutory duty to extend a city's taxes. A city can hire the clerk by contract instead.
  • The trial judge was wrong that a contract between the city and a different county officer could create that statutory duty.
  • The clerk was still not owed extra pay. The 1991 contract ended by its own terms when the parties wanted changes in 2018, and she was not a party to the 2018 contract, which provides her no pay.

The panel reversed on the question of duty and entered judgment for the clerk and the city on it. It affirmed the trial judge on the pay claims.

Ruling 11: The clean-water permit case (Countryclub Homes v. Department of Natural Resources, December 24, 2019)

The case. A company applied for a state permit for a large cattle feeding operation (a CAFO) in Johnson County. The application named “Country Club Homes LLC” as the owner and the responsible operator, but no such company existed. The company's real name was “Countryclub Homes, LLC.” A state reviewer assumed it was a typo and issued the permit. Neighbors, including Powell Gardens and a nearby family farm, challenged the permit. The state's Clean Water Commission voted 4-1 to deny it, and the applicant appealed.

The panel and the vote. Chief Judge Mitchell (presiding), Judge Hardwick, and Judge Martin. Judge Hardwick wrote the opinion, and all concurred.

What the panel held.

  • The neighbors had standing to appeal. A Supreme Court decision from 2004 had already rejected the argument that only applicants may appeal, and it still bound the panel.
  • The commission's 180-day deadline was a directory deadline, not a mandatory one. The legislature wrote no penalty for missing it, and the court would not add one. It noted the legislature had written penalties for other deadlines in the same scheme.
  • The commission did not have to read the parties' proposed decisions, and a commissioner's visit to the site did not void his vote.
  • The application failed to identify the entity that would operate the facility, because the named company did not exist. The agency had no authority to fix that on its own. Its regulation says it must either return the application or tell the applicant of the problem, and it did neither.

The panel affirmed the denial, did not reach the other grounds for denial, and sent the case back for a decision on whether the neighbors' group is owed attorney fees.

Ruling 12: A post-conviction case (Williams v. State, November 8, 2016)

The case. Richard Williams was convicted of first-degree murder and armed criminal action and sentenced to life without parole plus 30 years. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. He then filed a timely request for post-conviction relief with 23 claims, and a public defender was appointed. The public defender's amended motion was filed one day after the deadline. The motion court denied relief without asking whether the motion was late.

The panel and the vote. Judge Howard (presiding), Judge Hardwick, and Judge Ardini. Judge Hardwick wrote the opinion, and all concurred.

What the panel held. A late amended motion creates a presumption that the lawyer abandoned the client, and the Supreme Court has said the motion court must look into that. The motion court also never ruled on 14 of the claims in the original motion. The State agreed the amended motion was late and that the case should go back. The panel reversed and sent the case back so the motion court could decide whether Williams was abandoned. It did not decide whether any of his claims has merit.

What the court could have ruled

The ruling as issued and a real alternative. Not our conclusion.

For each ruling, the alternative below is one that a judge, a trial court, or a party actually argued. Neither column is our conclusion. That comes in the next section.

Director of Revenue v. Miller (2025)

What the panel ruled (3-0)

  • A tax-lien certificate filed with the circuit clerk is enforced like a judgment, so the ten-year limit on judgments applies.
  • The department did not revive the lien in time, so it could not garnish wages.
  • The ten-year limit ends one remedy, not the debt, so it does not violate the constitution's bar on releasing debts owed to the state.
  • A 2018 footnote in an earlier Western District case pointed the same way.

Support for this ruling: three judges, unanimous.

What it could have ruled (the trial court and the department)

  • The trial judge held that the certificate is not itself a circuit court judgment, so the ten-year rule does not apply.
  • The department argued that the lien statute for clerk filings contains no time limit.
  • The department argued that applying the ten-year rule would let the legislature forgive a debt owed to the state, which the constitution forbids.

Support for the alternative: the trial court's judgment and the department's arguments.

Western Cass Sunshine Law case (2025)

What the panel ruled (2-1)

  • The trial judge weighed the evidence and credibility after the plaintiffs' case, so the appeals court defers to that judgment.
  • Because the record did not show which ground the trial judge relied on, the plaintiffs had to challenge every possible ground. They did not.
  • Many points on appeal lumped several rulings together and cited no record, so they preserved nothing for review.
  • Two of the plaintiffs were board members who took part in some of the conduct they sued over.

Support for this ruling: two judges, Chapman and Hardwick.

What it could have ruled (the dissent)

  • Presume the trial judge granted judgment on the arguments in the district's motion, because the basis of the ruling is not otherwise known.
  • The plaintiffs' briefs challenged each of those arguments one by one, so their briefing was enough.
  • Reach the merits of the 40-plus alleged Sunshine Law violations instead of deciding the appeal on briefing.

Support for the alternative: Judge Ahuja's separate dissenting opinion.

Blue Springs (2024)

What the panel ruled (3-0)

  • The Supreme Court's 2019 opinion controlled, and the Missouri Constitution makes Supreme Court decisions binding on lower courts.
  • Footnotes in that opinion rejected the view that sex is fixed by genitalia at birth and pointed to birth-certificate amendments. The 2019 opinion also called legislative silence a poor guide to a statute's meaning.
  • On the evidence, the district's own explanation showed it discriminated because of the student's sex.
  • Setting aside the verdict and ordering a new trial was error.

Support for this ruling: three judges, unanimous. It followed the reading of the 2019 footnotes that the panel adopted.

What it could have ruled (the Supreme Court's later approach)

  • Treat the meaning of “sex” as still open. The Supreme Court's 2025 majority said the 2019 opinion declined to define it, and the 2019 majority itself said it was addressing only whether the petition stated a claim.
  • Defer to the trial judge's order for a new trial. The panel's own opinion recites that trial courts have broad discretion on that question.
  • Hold that Bostock's reasoning does not carry over to bathrooms and locker rooms, because Bostock said it was not addressing them.
  • Give weight to the legislature's repeated decisions not to add gender identity to the Act.

Support for the alternative: the Supreme Court adopted it, 5-2, in 2025. Two Supreme Court judges had also dissented in 2019.

L.O. v. Hansbrough (2023)

What the panel ruled (3-0)

  • The trial judge abused her discretion by refusing all discovery on the noose incidents. How the district handled them bears on whether it knew of a hostile environment and failed to act.
  • Discovery is broader than admissibility, and the Supreme Court has allowed evidence of other incidents to show discriminatory intent.
  • The commission's refusal to issue a right to sue did not make the evidence irrelevant.
  • Student records stay protected under federal privacy law.

Support for this ruling: three judges, unanimous, and Supreme Court decisions on broad discovery and “me too” evidence.

What it could have ruled (the trial judge and the district)

  • Leave the trial judge's discovery ruling alone and let it be reviewed on appeal after trial. Trial judges have broad discretion over discovery, and writ relief is extraordinary.
  • The district argued the noose incidents were stricken from the petition, the commission denied a right to sue on them, and the student did not witness them.
  • The panel itself left the trial judge's separate ruling striking the allegations in place.

Support for the alternative: the trial judge's ruling, the district's arguments, and the panel's own acknowledgment that relief by writ is extraordinary.

Payne v. Nilsson (2023)

What the panel ruled (3-0)

  • Parents are presumed fit, and a grandparent must prove that the child's welfare requires visitation, not just that visits would be in the child's best interests.
  • A close, beneficial relationship with a grandparent is not enough by itself.
  • The parents' testimony and their failure to answer were not admissions.
  • The court may not add words to the statute to set a lower bar for visitation.

Support for this ruling: three judges, unanimous, and earlier Missouri decisions on the parental presumption.

What it could have ruled (the trial judge and the grandmother)

  • Affirm the visits. The trial judge found regular contact with the grandmother would be in the child's best interests and the parents showed no harm from it.
  • Treat the standard as lower for visitation than for custody, as the grandmother argued.
  • Treat the parents' failure to answer and their openness to some contact as admissions.

Support for the alternative: the trial judge's judgment and the grandmother's arguments. No judge adopted them.

Fitz-James v. Ashcroft (2023)

What the panel ruled (3-0)

  • Several of the Secretary's phrases misdescribed the petitions' probable effects. For example, unrestricted abortion through all nine months was not a probable effect.
  • The trial judge did not exceed his authority by rewriting the summaries, and most of his rewrite was affirmed.
  • Courts must act with restraint in the initiative process and may not judge a measure's wisdom or its effect on other laws.
  • The panel added language on the nondiscrimination provision and on the ban being removed “at any stage of gestation.”

Support for this ruling: three judges, unanimous.

What it could have ruled (the Secretary's position)

  • The Secretary's language was fair. The petitions' exceptions for the life or health of the pregnant person are so broad that they swallow the limits on regulation.
  • The petitions presume any restriction on abortion invalid, so describing them as allowing unregulated abortion fairly summarized their effect.
  • The trial judge should have made only the smallest changes possible instead of rewriting the summaries entirely.

Support for the alternative: the Secretary's arguments. No judge adopted them.

Perea v. Progressive Northwestern Insurance (2023)

What the panel ruled (3-0)

  • Kansas law governs a Kansas policy.
  • The payments were late, but Kansas law excuses delay when the insurer has reasonable proof it may not owe the money. The insurer was checking whether another insurer had already paid.
  • The assignment of benefits to the chiropractor was enforceable under Kansas law.
  • The attorney lien claim failed.

Support for this ruling: three judges, unanimous, and the Kansas statute and Kansas court decisions.

What it could have ruled (the policyholder and her lawyer)

  • The late payments breached the policy, and the insurer owed 18% interest and attorney's fees.
  • Missouri's ban on assigning personal-injury claims made the assignment to the chiropractor unenforceable.
  • The insurer had to pay the lawyer's fee out of the chiropractor's share.

Support for the alternative: the policyholder's arguments. No judge adopted them.

Empire District Electric / Liberty (2023)

What the panel ruled (3-0)

  • The commission followed the securitization statute in crediting customers with the retired plant's deferred tax balance.
  • The commission could disallow 5% of the storm fuel and purchased-power costs, in line with the utility's usual 95/5 cost sharing, because the statute requires recovery to be just and reasonable and to benefit customers.
  • Carrying charges set at the utility's long-term debt rate meet the statute.
  • The consumer advocate's motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely was denied.

Support for this ruling: three judges, unanimous, and deference to the commission under the statute.

What it could have ruled (the utility's position)

  • The commission's calculation of the plant costs violated the securitization statute and lacked evidence.
  • The commission imposed a blanket reduction on storm fuel costs that the statute did not allow.
  • Carrying charges should have included the return shareholders would earn.

Support for the alternative: the utility's arguments. No judge adopted them.

Missouri Ethics Commission v. LeVota (2021)

What the panel ruled (3-0)

  • Any “person” who makes an expenditure in violation of the campaign-finance chapter can be penalized, not just the committee treasurer.
  • LeVota violated the check-signing rule even though the treasurer approved the payments.
  • The payments were for allowable purposes, so he did not violate the personal-use ban.
  • The Ethics Commission must now set the penalty for the check-signing violation.

Support for this ruling: three judges, unanimous, and the statute's broad definition of “person.”

What it could have ruled (the Hearing Commission and the circuit court)

  • The Hearing Commission held that only the committee treasurer can be held liable, so LeVota broke no law.
  • The circuit court went the other way and upheld both violations and both $10,000 fees.
  • The Hearing Commission also found the payments proper because the treasurer authorized them.

Support for the alternatives: the Hearing Commission's decision, and the circuit court's judgment on the other side.

Cooper County Clerk v. Cooper County Commission (2021)

What the panel ruled (3-0)

  • A county clerk has no statutory duty to extend a city's taxes. The legislature imposes that duty clearly on other taxing bodies, and not on cities.
  • A contract between the city and a different county officer cannot create a statutory duty for the clerk.
  • The clerk is not owed extra pay. The 1991 contract expired, and she was not a party to the 2018 contract.
  • The trial judge was affirmed on pay and reversed on duty.

Support for this ruling: three judges, unanimous.

What it could have ruled (the commission and the trial judge)

  • The statute covers any taxing body “authorized by law to make levies,” so the clerk had to extend the city's taxes as part of her duties.
  • A county contract with the city triggers the duty, and no extra pay is owed.
  • The clerk could have been paid under the old 1991 contract, if it was still in force.

Support for the alternative: the commission's reading of the statute and the trial judge's judgment.

Countryclub Homes v. Department of Natural Resources (2019)

What the panel ruled (3-0)

  • Neighbors may appeal a permit decision. The Supreme Court had already decided that, and it bound the panel.
  • The 180-day deadline is directory. The legislature wrote no penalty for missing it, and a court may not invent one.
  • The application named a company that did not exist, and the agency had no power to correct that itself.
  • The denial of the permit stands.

Support for this ruling: three judges, unanimous, and a Supreme Court decision on standing.

What it could have ruled (the applicant's arguments)

  • Only applicants may appeal permit decisions, and the commission's late decisions are void.
  • A typographical error in a name should not defeat a permit.
  • The agency's historical practice was to treat errors like this one as correctable, and its own reviewer treated the name as a typo and issued the permit.
  • The agency failed to follow its own regulation by not asking the applicant to fix the error, and the permit should not be lost because of the agency's mistake.

Support for the alternative: the applicant's arguments and the agency reviewer's original treatment of the error. No judge adopted them.

Williams v. State (2016)

What the panel ruled (3-0)

  • The amended motion was one day late, which raises a presumption that the public defender abandoned the client.
  • The motion court must look into that, and it never ruled on 14 of the original claims.
  • The case goes back to the motion court. The panel did not decide the merits of any claim.

Support for this ruling: three judges, the State's agreement, and Supreme Court decisions that send these questions to the motion court.

What it could have ruled (the motion court)

  • Deny relief without asking whether the amended motion was late, which is what the motion court did.
  • Decide the merits of Williams's remaining claim itself instead of sending the case back.

Support for the alternative: the motion court's judgment. The panel said it could not use that route under the Supreme Court's decisions.

Act for Missouri's View

Everything in this box is our opinion.

Act for Missouri's position: do not retain Judge Hardwick.

Retention is a vote on whether a judge has earned another 12-year term. We put the burden on the judge to show that she has, and we can only weigh what we were able to verify. Below is how we read each ruling we reviewed.

How we label a ruling

Law required this result We may be disappointed in the outcome, but the judge was right to rule as he or she did.

Law allowed either result Both readings have real support. The judge's choice shows how he or she weighs competing principles. It is not an error.

Law did not support this result The judge went beyond what the law allowed.

Director of Revenue v. Miller (2025)Law required this result

Our reading. The statute says a lien filed with the circuit clerk has the force of a default judgment and is enforced like other judgments. Judgments expire after ten years unless they are revived. The panel applied that text and would not write an exemption for the state. The trial judge read the statute the other way.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Hardwick. We think she read the text correctly, in the taxpayer's favor, and declined to add words the legislature did not write. If the state wants its liens to last longer, it can revive them in time or ask the legislature to change the statute.

Western Cass Sunshine Law case (2025)Law allowed either result

Our reading. The majority held that the plaintiffs had to challenge every ground that could support the trial judge's decision, and that their appeal broke the court's briefing rules. The dissent argued that the court should presume the trial judge relied on the district's motion, so the plaintiffs' briefing was enough. Both readings had support from a judge on the panel.

Where we differ. We do not differ with the panel. The plaintiffs' appeal broke the court's briefing rules, and two of them were board members who took part in the conduct they sued over. Anyone bringing a transparency claim needs to follow those rules.

2024 Blue Springs panel decisionLaw allowed either result

Our reading. The panel read the Supreme Court's 2019 footnotes as settling that “sex” is not limited to biological sex. The Supreme Court later said that opinion declined to define “sex.” The panel could have treated the question as open, and it could have deferred to the trial judge's order for a new trial. It did neither.

Where we differ. We would have kept the question open and let the trial judge's decision stand. The panel's choice, which Judge Hardwick joined, shows a broader view than ours of how much weight to give a precedent's footnotes and how far to extend federal reasoning such as Bostock.

L.O. v. Hansbrough (2023)Law allowed either result

Our reading. This was a ruling about discovery, not about whether the district discriminated. The panel could have left the trial judge's discretion alone and let the issue be reviewed after trial. It chose to step in early, relying on Supreme Court decisions that discovery is broader than admissibility. The order requires a public school district to open its records on how it handled these incidents, while keeping student records protected.

Where we differ. We agree the district should have to account for how it handled these incidents, and the law supports broad discovery. We do not differ with the panel.

Payne v. Nilsson (2023)Law required this result

Our reading. Missouri starts from a presumption that parents are fit. A grandparent who wants court-ordered visits must prove the child's welfare requires them, which takes more than a loving relationship. The panel would not lower that bar by adding words the legislature did not write.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Hardwick. The ruling protects the right of fit parents to decide who sees their child, and it is exactly what the statute says.

Fitz-James v. Ashcroft (2023)Law allowed either result

Our reading. The summary statute requires language that is fair and sufficient. The panel found several of the Secretary's phrases misdescribed the petitions' probable effects and affirmed most of the trial judge's rewrite. The Secretary argued that the amendment's exceptions were so broad that his language was accurate, and that the court should have made only minimal changes. We do not think the panel got this one right.

Where we differ. We would have kept more of the Secretary's language. The panel's choice, which Judge Hardwick joined as presiding judge, shows a narrower view than ours of how much latitude the Secretary has in describing a measure to voters. See our disclosure below.

Perea v. Progressive Northwestern Insurance (2023)Law required this result

Our reading. The policy was issued under Kansas law, so Kansas law decided whether the delay was excused and whether the assignment to the chiropractor was valid. Under that law the insurer was allowed to delay while it confirmed another insurer had not already paid.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Hardwick. This is a private contract dispute decided by the law the parties' policy chose.

Empire District Electric / Liberty (2023)Law required this result

Our reading. The legislature's securitization law lets a utility recover extraordinary costs through bonds paid by customers, but requires that recovery be just and reasonable and benefit customers. The commission approved about $72 million less than the utility asked, and the panel found it followed the statute at each step. The result favored ratepayers.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Hardwick. If there is a concern with securitization itself, that is a question about the law the legislature wrote, not about the court that applied it.

Missouri Ethics Commission v. LeVota (2021)Law required this result

Our reading. The campaign-finance law lets the state penalize any person who makes an expenditure in violation of it, and it defines “person” broadly. The panel would not read in a limit to the committee treasurer that the legislature did not write. It also upheld the finding that the payments were for allowable purposes.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Hardwick. She read the law as written, and the result holds a political operative to the same check-signing rules as everyone else. If the penalty is too light, that is a question for the legislature.

Cooper County Clerk v. Cooper County Commission (2021)Law required this result

Our reading. A county officer's duties come from statute. The legislature imposes the duty to extend taxes clearly on fire, school, and water districts, and it did not for cities. The panel would not stretch the statute, and it would not stretch the contracts to pay the clerk extra either.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Hardwick. The panel kept county officials to the duties the legislature assigned them and to the contracts they signed.

Countryclub Homes v. Department of Natural Resources (2019)Law required this result

Our reading. Standing was settled by a Supreme Court decision that bound the panel. The legislature wrote no penalty for the late deadline, so the court would not add one. The application named a company that did not exist, and the agency's regulation gave it no power to fix that itself. The result was hard on the applicant, and the agency's own reviewer contributed by issuing the permit instead of asking for a correction.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Hardwick on the law. She kept the agency within the limits of its own regulation, which is what we want from a court. If the process is unfair to applicants, the fix is for the agency to follow its rule on notifying them or for the legislature to change it.

Williams v. State (2016)Law required this result

Our reading. A one-day-late amended motion creates a presumption that the public defender abandoned the client. The Supreme Court says the motion court must look into that, and the State agreed. We may be uncomfortable with a murder case going back to the motion court, but the panel was bound by the rules and by Supreme Court precedent.

Where we differ. We do not differ with Judge Hardwick. Following these rules is the court's job, and the State itself asked for this result.

What this adds up to. We reviewed twelve rulings out of well over 800 opinions. In eight of them, including the parental-rights case and the insurance case we chose by a fixed rule, the law required the result and we found nothing to criticize. In the other four the law allowed either result. In two of those, Blue Springs and the abortion-amendment ballot summary, we would have chosen differently. In the other two, the discovery case and the Sunshine Law case, we agree with the panel. In each of the five where she joined another judge's opinion, the writing and reasoning were that judge's, not hers. In the seven opinions she wrote, she started from the words of the statute or regulation, followed the Supreme Court's precedents, and declined to add exceptions or penalties the legislature had not written. That is the method we look for. Our position rests on the four judgment calls, not on the rulings where the law left no choice. The two where we would have chosen differently fall on issues on which we weigh a judge's judgment most heavily. Under our standard the judge carries the burden of showing she has earned another term, and on the judgment calls we reviewed we do not think she has. We say that while acknowledging that we found her reading of statutes careful and consistent, and that we found no pattern of rulings outside the law.

What did not weigh against her. In Blue Springs, the panel's reading of the 2019 footnotes was a reading of the Supreme Court's own words, and the panel said plainly that it believed it was bound by them. We do not claim the panel acted outside the law in either of the rulings where we differ. We found nothing that suggests problems with her conduct or temperament, though we did not look at those areas independently.

A disclosure. Act for Missouri opposed the 2024 Amendment 3 and opposes the 2026 Amendment 3 on this year's ballot. Keep that in mind when you weigh our view of the Fitz-James ruling, which concerned the 2024 measure.

What to do with this. Read the record and the alternatives first. The official committee evaluation is linked below. If you weigh the same facts differently, that is a reasonable position, and the vote is yours.

Sources

Every fact in The Record comes from the court opinions or official pages below. Read them yourself.

Last updated October 8, 2026.

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